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Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grunet:
The Supreme Court Shall Make No Law
Defining an Establishment of Religion
"This area of constitutional law is an example of chaos theory."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet, the United States Supreme Court, in a six to three plurality
decision, held that a New York statute which created a public school
district contiguous with the boundaries of the Village of Kiryas Joel and
inhabited exclusively by members of the Satmar Hasidic sect of Judaism
violated the Establishment Clause.' The disabled children who lived in
the Village of Kiryas Joel suffered "panic, fear and trauma" upon encoun-
tering non-Satmars, whose style of dress and behavior were extremely
different from their own, when they left the Village of Kiryas Joel to
attend public schools." The Satmar children went to the public schools
to obtain the special education services to which they were entitled un-
der state and federal law. In order to relieve the children of this trauma,
the New York legislature created the Kiryas Joel Village School District
which operated a public school within the Village of Kiryas Joel.' This
public school provided special education services to the disabled Satmar
children The Court, however, invalidated the statute because it created
a "'fusion' of governmental and religious functions" and did not guaran-
1. Thomas E. Baker, Creating a Public School District for an Insular Religious
Community: Has the State Gone Too Far or Just Far Enough?, 6 PREVIEW OF UNIT-
ED STATES SuPREmE CouiT CASES, 1993-94 TERM, 248, 249 (March 18, 1994) (citing
Glenn H. Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLum. L REV. 110 (1991) (referring to
the U.S. Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions)).
2. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
3. Id. at 2494. The First Amendment provides in part that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2485; see infra notes 152-68 and accompanying text
(describing the Satmar culture).
5. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
6. Id. at 2485-86.
7. Id. at 2486.
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tee that other groups would receive the same treatment.' For the Court,
the statute represented an unconstitutional method of providing the dis-
abled Satmar children with the state and federal special education servic-
es to which they were entitled by law.'
Grumet represents, at first glance, an inscrutable addition to an al-
ready inscrutable area of constitutional jurisprudence-the Establishment
Clause. 0 Since 1971, the Court has judged Establishment Clause issues
against no less than five tests and offered scant guidance as to which
test may apply in any given case." The six opinions issued in Grumet,
none of which gained the support of a majority of Justices, proliferated
this chaotic tradition.2
Like other recent Establishment Clause decisions, the highly splintered
Grumet opinions did not produce a single test or rationale that com-
manded the support of a majority of Justices or upon which the Court is
likely to agree and apply in future cases. However, close examination
of the opinions reveals useful indicators of where the Justices' Establish-
ment Clause viewpoints fall.'4 Within their Grumet opinions, the Justices
redefined old and created new tests against which to evaluate Establish-
ment Clause cases. 5 The Justices' outcomes also remained consistent
8. Id. at 2488.
9. Id. at 2485-88.
10. "Supreme Court commentators have been virtually unanimous in their censure
of the Justices' reasoning in religion clause cases: the Court's decisionmaking in this
area has been portrayed as 'bizarre,' 'fatuous,' 'a hodgepodge derived from Alice's Ad-
ventures in Wonderland.'" Ronald F. Thiemann, Beyond the Separation of Church and
State: Public Religion and Constitutional Values, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 48, 48 (1994).
11. In 1973, the Court promulgated the Lemon test, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971), and since then has formulated numerous other tests. See infra
notes 315-83 and accompanying text. "It is difficult to identify a consistent or coher-
ent pattern of reasoning in the Court's treatment of religion . . . ." Thiemann, supra
note 10, at 48. "Over the past decade, the area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
has been clouded by a veil of change and uncertainty. Tests used by the Court have
been revised, re-examined, and even ignored." Craig L Olivo, Note, Grumet v. Board
of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District: When Neutrality Masks Hos-
tility-The Exclusion of Religious Communities vrom An Entitlement to Public
Schools, 68 NOTRE DAME L REv. 775, 813 (1993).
12. Justice Souter wrote the plurality opinion, which was joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens in full and Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg in part. Grumet,
114 S. Ct. at 2484. Justice Stevens wrote a concurrence in which Justices Blackmun
and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Kennedy wrote concurring opinions in which no other justices joined.
Id. at 2493 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 2495 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2501 (Kenne-
dy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. See infra notes 203-311 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 203-311 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 315-99 and accompanying text.
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with their previous decisions within a few specific areas of Establish-
ment Clause precedent."6 Furthermore, a majority of Justices called for
the reexamination of a landmark Establishment Clause decision.' These
doctrinal shifts will certainly impact future Establishment Clause deci-
sions.8 But, beyond its precedential effects, Grumet represents a signifi-
cant indication as to how federal and state governments may, consistent
with the Establishment Clause, provide special education services to dis-
abled children attending private religious schools. 9
In order to make sense of Grumet and unlock the indicators hidden
within its dizzying array of Establishment Clause rhetoric, this Casenote
explores the Establishment Clause precedent surrounding the issues
raised in Grumet.' Next, after presenting Grumet's factual background
and lower court opinions, this Casenote analyzes the six opinions handed
down in Grumet2 The Impact section evaluates how Grumet redefined
old and created new Establishment Clause tests, the effect Grumet may
have on future Establishment Clause cases, and, finally, Grumet's indica-
tion of how the Court will reconcile the conflict between the Establish-
ment Clause and government aid to disabled private religious school stu-
dents.' The Casenote concludes by emphasizing the tremendous discon-
tinuity in the Court's Establishment Clause doctrine and suggesting what
the Court might do in the future to allow the nation to effectively and
equitably deal with the conflicts that arise when its citizens confront the
Establishment Clause.'
16. See infra notes 416-46 and accompanying text.
17. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas
stated their willingness to reconsider Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). Grumet,
114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 2515
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, four Justices, those stated minus Justice
O'Connor, called for the reconsideration of Aguilar's companion case, School District
of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2505
(Kennedy, J., concurring), 2515 (Scalia J., dissenting).
18. See irfra notes 416-46 and accompanying text.
19. See irtfra notes 447-85 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 24-151 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 152-311 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 312-485 and accompanying text.
23. See ifra notes 486-90 and accompanying text.
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II. flisTORIcAL BACKGROUND
Given the lack of any clear line of cases supporting the Court's reason-
ing in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet,u this Casenote explores the two areas of Establishment Clause
precedent most directly relevant to the Justices' varying approaches to
the case. These lines of precedent do not represent a complete picture of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.u This analysis instead attempts to
clarify this muddled area of law and point out the recurring themes lead-
ing to Grumet.
Despite its appearance as a government aid to religious schools case,
Grumet, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, was more about the alloca-
tion of political power in support of religion than private sectarian edu-
cation.' Consequently, this section first explores cases where the state
in some way aided religion via direct state funding of nonpublic institu-
tions as part of neutral aid schemes that benefit religious and nonreli-
gious institutions alike or by removing government obstacles to the free
exercise of religion.' Next, this section presents cases involving alloca-
tions of state power in support of religion.' The factual distinctions be-
tween government aid programs and the conferral of government power
upon religious groups may seem slight at first, but slight distinctions are
the nature of the Establishment Clause beast and are, as the Court's deci-
sions reflect, crucial to most Establishment Clause holdings.2 This his-
24. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
25. For more complete surveys of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see DONALD
L DRAKEMAN, CHURCH-STATE CONSTmTIONAL ISSUES (1991); JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD
D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1157-1206 (4th ed. 1991); THE SUPREME COURT ON
CHURCH AND STATE (Robert S. Alley ed., 1988); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
srmmONAL LAW 1154-1301 (2d ed. 1988); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of
Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L REv. 230 (1993); Julie K Underwood, Changing
Establishment Analysis Within and Outside the Context of Education, 33 How. LJ.
53 (1990).
26. See Grumet, 114 S.Ct. at 2487.
27. See infra notes 30-121 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 122-51 and accompanying text.
29. In his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice Rehnquist catalogued the
seemingly indistinguishable distinctions made by the Court throughout its Establish-
ment Clause decisions in the area of parochial education. 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
For example, a State may lend to parochial school children geography text-
books that contain maps of the United States, but the State may not lend
maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State may lend text-
books on American colonial history, but it may not lend a'film on George
Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted); see also Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2499
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting how subtle differences in the wording of each prong
1602
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torical analysis finds the Court most willing to reject Establishment
Clause challenges in cases involving neutral, generally applicable govern-
ment aid programs that have the affect of benefiting religious, as well as
nonreligious, institutions or citizens.
A. Government Aid to Religion Cases
1. Direct State Funding of Non-Public Institutions
Cases addressing what the Court labels state programs that have the
effect of providing direct funding to religious institutions usually result in
the Court finding a violation of the Establishment Clause.' The seminal
case in which the Court invalidated this kind of support is Lemon v.
Kurtzman.
3
1
At issue in Lemon was a Rhode Island statute which authorized state
subsidization of the salaries of teachers who taught secular subjects in
nonpublic elementary schools.' Also at issue was a similar Pennsylvania
statute that effectively reimbursed nonpublic schools for teachers' sala-
ries, textbooks, and other materials used to teach secular subjects.'
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, set forth what is now
known as the Lemon test: "First, the statute must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
'an excessive government entanglement with religion. '"' Applying this
of the Lemon test leads to "more complicated definitions which stray ever further from
their literal meaning").
30. See infra notes 32-67 and accompanying text.
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon and its test for Establishment Clause cases has
generated, and continues to generate, an astonishing amount of commentary. See, e.g.,
Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. REs. L REV. 865 (1993); Roald Y.
Mykkeltvedt, Souring on Lemon: The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause Doctrine
in Transition, 44 MERCER L REV. 881 (1993); Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 795 (1993); John C. Polifka, Use of the Lemon Test in the Re-
view of Public School Curricular Decisions Concerning "Secular Humanism" Under
the Establishment Clause, 33 S.D. L. REV. 112 (1988); Eric J. Segall, Parochial School
Aid Revisited, The Lemon Test, The Endorsement Test and Religious Liberty, 28 SAN
DIEGO L REV. 263 (1991); Douglas C. Shimonek, Comment, Using the Lemon Test as
Camouflage: Avoiding the Establishment Clause, 16 Wm. MITCHELL L REV. 835 (1990).
32. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-09.
33. Id. at 609-10.
34. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citations
omitted). Before announcing the Lemon test, Justice Burger noted that: "In the ab-
sence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines with refer-
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test, the Court found that both statutes violated the Establishment
Clause because they failed the test's third prong.' Lemon signaled two
important developments in Establishment Clause doctrine. First, state
programs designed to aid or improve the quality of education at private
sectarian schools would be subject to rigorous constitutional scrutiny
and would most likely fail.' Second, and more importantly, the Court
ence to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was intended to
afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sover-
eign in religious activity.'" Id. at 612 (quoting Wa/z, 397 U.S. at 668). Thus, the Lem-
on test flowed from these policy considerations and encompassed three separate tests
"gleaned" from the Court's precedents. Id. at 612-13.
35. The Court held that the statutes were fostered by a permissible secular legisla-
tive purpose-improvement of the quality of secular education in religious schools. Id.
at 613. "A State always has a legitimate concern for maintaining minimum standards
in all schools it allows to operate." Id. Thus, the statutes passed the first Lemon
prong. Id. Then the Court passed over the issue of whether the statutes had the
primary or principle effect of advancing religion, the second prong, because the stat-
utes violated the third prong. Id. at 613-14. "[W]e conclude that the cumulative im-
pact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes . . . involves excessive en-
tanglement between government and religion." Id. at 614. Analysis of the third prong,
the Court warned, did "not call for total separation between church and state; total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense." Id. Instead, the entanglement inquiry
revolved around the impermissibility of "programs, whose very nature is apt to entan-
gle the state in details of administration." Id. at 615 (quoting Wa/z, 397 U.S. at 695
(Harlan, J., concurring)). Entangling programs are discovered by examining "the char-
acter and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that
the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority." Id. Regarding the Rhode Island statute, the Court found that the
nature and administration of the state's Roman Catholic elementary schools, the
statute's sole beneficiaries, was permeated by religion. Id. at 615-20. Thus, the "com-
prehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" that would be required
to guarantee that the subsidized teachers did not "inculcate religion" led the Court to
find that the statute would cause excessive government entanglement with religion.
Id. at 619. Similarly, the Pennsylvania statute's provision of subsidies for teachers, as
well as other educational materials, in religious schools would require such extensive
surveillance to ensure that the state aid flowed only to secular activities that an
excessive entanglement between state and religion would result. Id. at 620-22.
As demonstrated by the Court's analysis, if a policy violates any of Lemon's
three prongs, it violates the Establishment Clause. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
40-41 (1980).
36. "The sole question is whether state aid to these schools can be squared with
the dictates of the Religion Clauses. Under our system, the choice has been made
that government is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious instruction and
churches excluded from the affairs of government." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625; see
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404, 414 (1985) (holding that City aid to "educational-
ly deprived children from low-income families" violated the Establishment Clause);
School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985) (holding
that remedial education programs provided by nonpublic teachers and on nonpublic
school grounds violated the Establishment Clause); Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973) (holding that state reimburse-
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placed the Lemon test at the center of its Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence.' While at times this centerpiece would be functional, it would
ultimately obstruct the ability of courts to clearly analyze Establishment
Clause cases.'
Violations of Lemon's second prong proved fatal for the state aid
schemes at issue in two "aid to sectarian school" cases.' In Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty,' the Court
found that a New York statute authorizing the state to reimburse
nonpublic, including religiously affiliated, schools for the costs of admin-
istering, grading, and compiling the results of state-prepared and
teacher-prepared tests violated the Establishment Clause as an "imper-
missible aid to religion."41 In Committee for Public Education and Reli-
ment for administering, grading, and compiling the results of standardized tests by
nonpublic schools violated the Establishment Clause); Committee for Pub. Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973) (describing the channel through
which states may aid the secular facets of religious instruction as a "narrow one").
37. In 1992, Justice Blackmun noted that
Since 1971, the Court has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases. In only one
instance, the decision of Marsh v. Chambers, has the Court not rested its
decision on the basic principles described in Lemon .... In no case involv-
ing religious activities in public schools has the Court failed to apply vigor-
ously the Lemon factors.
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2663 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, J. concurring) (citation
omitted). Since 1992, however, the Court has pulled away from the Lemon test, with
Justices only sporadically applying its framework. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2515
(Scala, J., dissenting); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2465-69
(1993); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2149-51 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (agreeing "with
the long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the
strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering shapes its in-
termittent use has produced," and cataloguing the then-current Justice's rejections and
criticisms of the Lemon test).
39. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 798; Levitt, 413 U.S. at 479-80.
40. 413 U.S. 472.
41. Id. at 474-75, 480. Key to the Court's decision were the facts that the state aid
could be used in administration, grading, compiling, and reporting the results of
nonpublic teacher-prepared tests and that the statute did not provide for state audits
of nonpublic schools' records to be sure the aid was not used "for religious worship
or instruction." Id. at 474-77. Furthermore, the tests prepared by the religious schools,
could possibly "inculcate students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring church."
Id. at 480. Thus, the Court characterized the statute as "a direct money grant" to
religious schools. Id.
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gious Liberty v. Nyquist,e the Court invalidated a state statute that aid-
ed nonpublic schools via repair and tuition reimbursement grants.' Ac-
cording to the Court, both statutes had the primary effect of advancing
religion, in violation of Lemon's second prong, because they amounted to
direct state subsidization of the sectarian schools' religious mission.'
Using Lemon as a guide rather than a test,* the Court in Meek v.
Pittenger' evaluated a Pennsylvania statute under which "auxiliary ser-
vices, textbooks, and instructional material[s that were] provided free of
charge to children attending public schools" would be loaned to nonsecu-
lar schools to be used for secular purposes.' The Court found the text-
book loan program permissible;' 8 however, "the direct loan of in-
structional material and equipment [had] the unconstitutional primary ef-
fect of advancing religion because of the predominantly religious charac-
ter of the schools benefiting from the Act."'" Thus, the instructional ma-
terials loan violated Lemon's second prong and, in turn, the Establish-
ment Clause.'
In two similar government aid to religious schools cases, Aguilar v.
Felton"' and School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball," the
42. 413 U.S. 756.
43. Id at 798. The Court, regarding the maintenance and repair grants, based its
finding on the statute's lack of restriction of the funds to secular uses. Id. at 774.
For instance, the costs of maintaining a religious school's chapel could be reimbursed
under the statute. Id. Regarding the tuition reimbursement grants, the Court also
found that the grants did not guarantee that the state money would be used for sec-
ular purposes. Id. at 780. "[T]he effect of the aide is unmistakably to provide . .. fi-
nancial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions." Id. at 783.
44. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyqust, 413 U.S. at 779-883;
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. at 480.
45. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1975).
46. 421 U.S. 349.
47. Id. at 351-53.
48. Id. at 362 (relying on Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (finding a
similar textbook loan program constitutional)). The Court relied on the facts that the
textbooks provided were those used in public 'schools and that the textbooks were
used in nonpublic schools only for secular purposes. Id. at 361-62.
49. Id. at 363. The Court noted that the over 75% of the nonpublic schools eligible
for aid under the statute were religiously affiliated and therefore the "primary bene-
ficiaries" of the statute were "nonpublic schools with a predominant sectarian charac-
ter." Id. at 364. Due to the character of the schools, "[slubstantial aid [to them] nec-
essarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole." Id. at 366 (cit-
ing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971)).
50. Id. at 366.
51. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
52. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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Court again struck down the aid schemes at issue. These companion
cases involved the use of federal funds to send public school teachers to
and provide classes at nonpublic schools.'
In Aguilar, a New York City program provided funding for the educa-
tional needs of "educationally deprived children from low-income fami-
lies." ' The Court found that the "critical elements of entanglement pro-
scribed in Lemon and Meek [were] ... present in this case."' Those two
elements were that "the aid [was] provided in a pervasively sectarian
environment," the religiously affiliated sectarian school, and that "ongo-
ing inspection [was] required to ensure the absence of a religious mes-
sage."' Thus, the Court held that because it violated Lemon's third
prong, this excessive entanglement violated the Establishment Clause. 7
Similar programs implemented by Grand Rapids, Michigan provided
public funding for remedial and community education classes taught by
public and nonpublic employees on nonpublic school campuses.' The
Grand Rapids Court found that because some of the classes were con-
ducted by nonpublic teachers and many of the subjects were indistin-
guishable from those taught during the "religious schoolday," there was a
"'substantial risk' that programs operating in this environment would 'be
used for religious educational purposes.'"' This kind of "symbolic un-
ion" of church and state in the religiously affiliated schools was "suffi-
ciently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denomina-
tions as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of
their individual religious choices."' Furthermore, the Court character-
53. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404-06; Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 375.
54. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404-05. The aid consisted of the provision of instructional
services, such as remedial reading and remedial mathematics programs, provided on
nonpublic school premises and conducted by public employees. Id. at 406. Under the
statute, 84% percent of the aid went to schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic
church. Id.
55. Id. at 412.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 414; see also Raymond L Robin, Note, Aguilar v. Felton: Lemon Revisit-
ed-The Supreme Court's Tug-of-War with the Entanglement Doctrine, 39 U. MIAMI L
REV. 957 (1985) (noting the significance of the Aguilar decision in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence).
58. School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985). The programs
provided for remedial mathematics, home economics, and chess classes. Id. at 376-77.
59. Id. at 388 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646, 656 (1980)).
60. Id. at 390. This opinion represented an important exposition on Lemon's sec-
ond prong. The notion that the primary effects test existed to prevent a state's en-
1607
ized the programs at issue as "indistinguishable from the provision of a
direct cash subsidy to the religious school that is most clearly prohibited
under the Establishment Clause."6' Thus, the programs' primary effect
was the promotion of religion and, as such, they violated Lemon's sec-
ond prong.'
Aguilar and Grand Rapids represent how similar government aid
schemes can violate the Establishment Clause in two different ways, as
violations of either Lemon's second or third prong.
Finally, in the area of government aid to religious institutions, the
Court in Larson v. Valente' held that a Minnesota statute, which im-
posed registration and reporting requirements on religious organizations
that solicited more than fifty percent of their funds from nonmembers,
was unconstitutional as an impermissible preference of some religious
groups over others." Justice Brennan's majority opinion stated that the
Establishment Clause's "clearest command" is that one religious group
must not be preferred over another.' The Court found that when such a
preference occurs, the law is suspect and must be evaluated using strict
scrutiny, a standard which the program at issue in Larson could not
meet.6M The Court utilized the strict scrutiny standard of review, rather
than the Lemon test, because the Court found that the Lemon test was
only designed to apply to laws which uniformly benefit all religions, rath-
er than provisions like the requirement at issue in Larson.'
dorsement of one particular religion or religion in general remains a central Establish-
ment Clause inquiry. Id.; see Brief for Petitioner Attorney General of the State of
New York at 17, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,
114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 & 93-539); infra notes 316-29 and accom-
panying text (explaining how the notion of endorsement was incorporated into the
Lemon test). The Court, in Grand Rapids, also noted that the concern for preventing
government endorsement of religion is particularly acute in educational settings where
"[tihe symbolism of a union between church and state is most likely to influence
children of tender years, whose experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently
are the function of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice." 473 U.S.
at 390.
61. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 395.
62. Id. at 396; see Von G. Keetch, Note, Grand Rapids School District v. Ball: An
Educational Perspective on the Evolution of Lemon, 1986 B.Y.U. L REv. 489 (1986)
(noting the significance of Grand Rapids in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
63. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
64. Id. at 230, 255.
65. Id. at 244.
66. Id. at 246.
67. Id at 252.
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2. Neutral Aid Schemes, the Benefit of which Accrues Directly to
Citizens Regardless of Religious Affiliation or Non-Affiliation
In this second line of aid to religion cases, the Court developed the
principle that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit all state aid to
religious organizations, but rather only prohibits aid schemes that ad-
vance or inhibit religion.M In the cases that follow, laws that advance or
inhibit religion are distinguished from laws that are neutral towards reli-
gion and, incidentally or intentionally, give some kind of assistance or
preference to religious organizations.' These neutral aid schemes are
the constitutionally permissible means by which a state can aid reli-
gion."
In Waz v. Tax Commission,7 the Court evaluated the New York City
Tax Commission's exemption from property taxes of property used by
religious organizations solely for religious worship.'m Despite the finan-
cial benefit incurred by the exempted properties, the Court concluded
that the statute did not constitute an establishment of religion.' The
opinion acknowledged the difficulty inherent in using government neu-
trality towards religion as a rigid Establishment Clause test.' Nonethe-
less, the Court based its decision on the statute's neutral treatment of
different religious groups in furtherance of the state's legitimate interest
in seeing that activities which foster general community improvement are
not inhibited by property taxes.' Ultimately, the Court found that this
statute represented a permissible accommodation of religion."
68. See infra notes 71-108 and accompanying text.
69. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672-75 (1970) (reasoning that a tax
exemption for places of worship did not advance or inhibit religion, but rather per-
missibly exempted churches from supporting the state).
70. See infra notes 71-108 and accompanying text.
71. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
72. Id. at 666-67.
73. Id at 692-93.
74. d. at 669.
75. Id. at 692-93. According to the Court, there were two main secular purposes
behind the tax exemptions at issue. Id. at 687. First, religious groups 'contribute to
the well-being of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways." Id. Second, reli-
gious groups are an important part of the "pluralism of American society" and, along
with other groups such as literary and historical groups, contribute to the diversity of
viewpoint in society. Id. at 689.
76. Id. at 692-93. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion began with the pro-
nouncement that the goal of Establishment Clause jurisprudence was to be "produc-
tive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference." Id. at 669. For a discussion of the notion of
1609
The Ohio statute at issue in Wolman v. Walter' authorized funding
for nonpublic schools in the form of "books, instructional materials and
equipment, standardized testing and scoring, diagnostic services, thera-
peutic services, and field trip transportation."' The Court held that all
the services were constitutionally permissible, except the provision of
instructional material and the field trip transportation funding.' Relying
on previous decisions on point, the Court upheld the textbook and test-
ing programs.' The provision of diagnostic, health-related, therapeutic
services represented neutral aid that the state provided to both public
and nonpublic students, the primary effect of which was not the ad-
vancement of religion.8 Hence, the state's provision of these services
did not violate Lemon's second prong or the Establishment Clause.'
The loan of instructional material, however, did violate the Establishment
Clause because the provision of even secular materials directly related to
the educational function of the religious schools constituted direct aid to
benevolent neutrality see ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOwARD BENEVO-
LENT NEUTRALrrY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 1987). The Walz
Court found that the statute's purpose was "neither the advancement nor the inhibi-
tion of religion; it [was] neither sponsorship nor hostility." Waz, 397 U.S. at 672. The
statute was thus characterized as "simply sparing the exercise of religion from the
burden" of property taxes. Id. at 673. Tax exemption did not transfer any government
money to religious groups, and therefore, the financial benefits incurred by the reli-
gious groups did not represent an establishment of religion. Id. at 675-76. The opinion
emphasized that the history of the United States, as well as modem society, does not
mandate absolute separation of church and state and has long allowed tax exemp-
tions for religious groups. Id. at 676-86. Thus, the opinion began with the principle of
neutrality and through its analysis developed and approved the notion of permissible
state accommodations of religion. Id. at 692-93; see infra notes 109-12 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the notion of governmental accommodation of religion).
77. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
78. Id. at 233.
79. Id. at 255.
80. Id. at 23741 (citing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (finding textbook
loan programs constitutional); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 240 (1968)
(same); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (finding unconstitu-
tional a reimbursement scheme for nonpublic schools' teacher-prepared testing ex-
penses based on the program's lack of assurance that the tests would not involve
religious instruction)).
81. 1d. at 242-48. "This Court's decisions contain a common thread to the effect
that the provision of health services to all schoolchildren-public and
nonpublic-does not have the primary effect of aiding religion." Id. at 242. Regarding
the therapeutic services, the Court noted that the services would be performed at
public schools, in public centers, or in mobile units not located on private school
grounds. Id. at 245. Because of this location, the "pervasively sectarian atmosphere of
the church-related school" was not present and so the provision of the services
would neither impermissibly advance religion nor excessively entangle the state in
religion. Id. at 247.
82. Id at 242.
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the "religious mission that is the only reason for the schools' exis-
tence."' The field trip transportation also represented direct aid to the
religious schools.' Consequently, these programs violated Lemon's sec-
ond, or primary effects, prong.' As a whole, Wolman provides a useful
catalogue of what kinds of programs represent constitutionally permis-
sible neutral aid schemes and what kinds represent impermissible direct
government funding of religious education.'
83. Id. at 250-51 (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 336). As it did in Levitt, 413 U.S. at
480, the Court compared the aid at issue to a cash grant to a religious school and
was unable to distinguish between the impermissible cash grant and the aid at issue.
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 251; see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
84. Wolman, 431 U.S. at 254.
85. Id.
86. The factual nuances of the programs at issue in Wolman, as they weigh
against the Court's concern for neutrality, help to clarify the Court's distinction be-
tween permissible and impermissible aid. The textbook program in Wolman autho-
rized the use of state funds to purchase "secular textbooks ... approved by the
superintendent of public instruction for use in public schools in the state and to loan
such textbooks to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the district or to their
parents." Id. at 236-37. This program ensured that the content of the textbooks re-
mained secular. Id. at 237-39. As such, the program represented aid given to all stu-
dents regardless of what school they attended which conveyed a purely secular mes-
sage. The program that supplied nonpublic school students with "standardized tests
and scoring services as are in use in the public schools of the state" also, by its
terms, provided services available to public school students to nonpublic school stu-
dents. Id. at 238-39 (citation omitted). These services were also purely secular in that
the nonpublic school personnel did not have any control over the content or scoring
of the tests, thus the state aid did not convey any nonsecular messages to the
test-takers. Id. at 239-40. The health diagnostic services, provided in the nonpublic
schools by state employees, represented an "insubstantial" danger of aiding religion
and thus passed the second prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 242. The Court also
found that the aid would not require "excessive surveillance" and so would not repre-
sent an impermissible entanglement under Lemon's third prong. Id. at 244. Similarly,
the therapeutic services, which would not be performed in nonpublic schools, also
passed the second and third Lemon prongs. Id. at 248. This analysis led the Court to
find that neutral aid schemes that could in some ways advance religion via the inter-
action between public employees and nonpublic students remained permissible as
long as the advancement of religion remained incidental or insignificant in relation to
other effects of the aid. See id. at 236-48.
On the other hand, the Court found the program that provided funding for the
purchase and loan of instructional materials and equipment like that used in public
schools to be unconstitutional. Id. at 248-52. This aid, because of its use in a perva-
sively sectarian school environment, could not be separated from schools' sectarian
mission and thus "the state aid inevitably flows in part in support of the religious
role of the schools." Id. at 250. The potential for the equipment to be integrated into
the religious teachings of the nonpublic schools lead the Court to find that this aid
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A Minnesota statute which gave parents of children who attended
nonpublic schools a tax deduction for the expenses incurred for tuition,
textbooks, and transportation associated with sending their children to
nonpublic schools survived Establishment Clause analysis in Mueller v.
A//en.Y Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, observed that the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence rejects the argument that any
state aid to religious institutions violates the Establishment Clause.'
The statute passed the Lemon test and did not violate the Establishment
Clause because legislatures have broad discretion in taxation matters, all
parents could deduct education expenses whether their children attended
public or nonpublic schools, and the state-funded benefit which flowed
to the parochial schools was minimal.' The statute at issue in MueUer,
therefore, represents the modem model of neutral state aid to education
schemes that are permissible under the Establishment Clause.'
program was indistinguishable from a cash grant to the schools and thus was uncon-
stitutional direct aid to religious schools. Id. at 251. The Court found the field trip
aid flawed in the same ways as the equipment aid scheme. Id. at 254. The field trip
aid did not provide services that could be distinguished from the schools' sectarian
teachings and therefore represented "an impermissible direct aid to sectarian educa-
tion." Id.
Thus, the distinction between a permissible neutral aid scheme and impermiss.
ble direct aid to religion is made by the Court's classification of the aid as available
to all public and nonpublic students, predominantly secular in its purpose and mes-
sage, and relatively incapable of diversion to sectarian use, versus a classification of
the aid as providing a direct subsidy of the recipient school's ability to advance its
sectarian mission. Id. at 248-52.
Also differentiating permissible neutral aid schemes from impermissible direct
government funding, the Court provided a useful analogy in Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-88 (1988). In Witters, the
Court explained that a state may issue a paycheck to a government employee who
then donates that money to a religious group without violating the Constitution, even
if the state knew of the intended donation before issuing the check. Id. at 486-87. On
the other hand, a state may not grant direct subsidies to religious groups, whether in
cash or in kind, or, indirectly through a student or parent, without violating the Con-
stitution. Id. at 487-88 (citing School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394
(1985); Wolman, 433 U.S. at 248-51).
87. 463 U.S. 388, 390-92 (1983). Despite the Court's notation of Lemon as "no
more than a helpful signpost" for Establishment Clause cases, the Court framed its
analysis around Lemon's three prongs. Id. at 394, 396, 403.
88. Id. at 393.
89. Id. at 384-97, 403.
90. This case represents a similar analysis to that used by the Court in Wolman,
433 U.S. 229, to uphold the health diagnostic and therapeutic services programs at
issue in that case. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist,
in Mue/e/r, strengthened the notion, introduced in Wolman, 433 U.S. at 241-48, that to
violate the Establishment Clause, an aid scheme's primary effect must be the ad-
vancement of religion. Mueler, 463 U.S. at 396-402.
For commentary regarding the Mueller decision, see Elizabeth A. Baergen, Note,
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The Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) provided for "grants to public
or nonprofit private organizations or agencies 'for services and research
in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy.'"9'
In Bowen v. Kendrick,. the Court found that despite the fact that mon-
ies granted under the act went to religiously affiliated institutions and
were used to further "the elimination or reduction of social and econom-
ic problems caused by teenage sexuality, pregnancy, and parenthood,"
the AFLA did not violate the Establishment Clause.' Applying the Lem-
on test, the Court found the AFLA valid on its face.' The Court also
reiterated its position that "religious institutions are [not] disabled by the
First Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare
programs.,
The Court, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind' and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, held that the
Tuition Tax Deductions and Credits in Light of Mueller v. Allen, 31 WAYNE L REV.
157 (1984); John W. Connolly, Note, Mueller v. Allen: A New Standard of Scrutiny
Applied to Tax Deductions for Educational Expenses, 1984 DuKE LJ. 983 (1984); J.
Edward Goff, Recent Development, 29 VILL U REV. 505 (1984); Elliot M. Schachner,
Religion and the Public Treasury After Taxation with Representation of Washington,
Mueller, and Bob Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 275 (1984); Hugh F. Smart, Note, Tax
Deductions as Permissible State Aid to Parochial Schools, 60 Cin.-KENT L REV. 657
(1984).
91. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988) (citation omitted).
92. 487 U.S. 589.
93. Id. at 593, 597, 602. The Bowen decision received both criticism and praise.
See, e.g., Margo R Drucker, Comment, Bowen v. Kendriclc Establishing Chastity at
the Expense of Constitutional Prophylactics, 64 N.Y.U. L REV. 1165 (1989); Joel T.
Ireland, Note, The Transfiguration of the Lemon Test: Church and State Reign Su-
preme in Bowen v. Kendrick, 32 ARIZ. L REV. 365 (1990); Alexandra Petrich, Com-
ment, Bowen v. Kendrick: Retreat from Prophylaxis in Church-State Relationships,
16 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 513 (1989); David T. Rothal, Note, Bowen v. Kendrick:
Church and State, and the Morality of Teenage Sex, 39 DEPAuL L REV. 1319 (1990);
Coreen K. Sweeney, Note, 39 DRAKE L REV. 783 (1989-1990).
94. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 622. The AFLA's secular purpose of preventing the prob-
lems created by 'teenage sexuality" and its ramifications allowed the AFLA to pass
Lemon's first prong. Id. at 602. Finding that the Establishment Clause does not pro-
hibit Congress from recognizing that religious institutions can help solve social
problems and that the AFLA provided for grants to religious and a variety of other
institutions in a neutral manner among religious groups and between religious and
nonreligious groups, the Court held that the AFLA passed Lemon's second prong. Id.
at 604-615. Finally, the government monitoring of institutions receiving AFLA grants
would not be excessive and therefore would not violate Lemon's third prong. Id. at
616-17.
95. Id. at 609.
96. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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provision of special educational services for disabled students attending
religious schools, under neutral state and federal aid programs, was con-
stitutionally permissible.'
Witters involved a blind student who was denied state vocational assis-
tance for blind students because he attended a Christian college.' The
Court applied the Lemon test and found that providing state aid directly
to students did not constitute an establishment of religion regardless of
the fact that a student receiving that aid attended a private religious
school."°
In Zobrest, the Court did not rely on the Lemon test to uphold a state's
provision of an interpreter for a deaf sectarian school student under the
Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA).' Chief Justice Rehnquist's ma-
97. 113 S. CL 2462 (1993).
98. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469; Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
99. Witters, 474 U.S. at 482.
100. Id. at 488. The Court found a valid primary secular purpose in the state's de-
sire to aid the visually handicapped through vocational rehabilitation services. Id. at
485-86. Because the statute provided aid directly to the student who then gave it to
the educational institution, the aid was available regardless of the recipient's choice
of institution and the aid did not benefit religious more than nonreligious vocations
or institutions. Id. at 486-89. Hence, the latter Lemon prongs were not violated and
the statute survived. Id.
For commentary on the Witters decision, see Megan E. Bovee et ai., Comment,
Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind: The Establishment
Clause and Financial Aid to Students for Religious Education at Private Institu-
tions, 13 J.C. & U.L 397 (1987); Stephen B. Thomas, Freedom of Choice in Higher
Education: Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 31 EDUC. L
REP. 373 (West 1986).
101. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2464; see infra notes 447-85 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing what the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires and how
it can exist alongside the Establishment Clause); see also Florence County Sch. Dist.
Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 366 (1993) (holding that reimbursement for tuition
costs of sending a disabled child to a private school was not barred where public
school did not meet IDEA requirements and private school was in substantial compli-
ance with IDEA requirements).
Zobrest generated a staggering volume of commentary. See, e.g., Dixie S.
Huefner, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District- A Foothill in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence?, 87 EDUC. L REP. 15 (West 1994); T. Page Johnson, Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District Does the Establishment Clause Bar Sending Public
School Employees into Religious Schools?, 82 EDUC. L REP. 5 (West 1993); T.
Johnathan Adams, Note, Interpreting State Aid to Religious Schools Under the Estab-
lishment Clause: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 72 N.C. L REv. 1039
(1994); Kaarin Long, Note, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: A Misapplica-
tion of Establishment Clause Precedent, 39 S.D. L REv. 404 (1994); Judith S. Rosen,
Note, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: Should the Wall Between Church
and State Come Crumbling Down? Punding Sign Language Interpreters and the
First Amendment, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 85 (1993); Jody Sturtz, Note, Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothill School District- Handicapped Children Versus the Establishment
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jority opinion relied on the principle that the Court has "never said that
'religious institutions are disabled by the First Amendment from partici-
pating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs.'"1" The Court reit-
erated its opinion that neutral provisions of government services given
directly to students and that happen to benefit nonpublic school children
are constitutional.l"
These two cases, taken together, demonstrate how, with or without
the Lemon test, the Court found that a student's enrollment at a religious
educational institution does not automatically make him or her ineligible
to receive the benefits of neutral government aid schemes which are
applicable to all students."
The Court proactively enforced its previous holdings that states may
neutrally provide students with services that incidentally benefit religious
institutions in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District."" In Lamb's Chapel, the Court unanimously held that the
School District's refusal to allow religious programs to be run after-hours
in school buildings where non-religious activities were permitted was an
impermissible, viewpoint-based violation of Lamb's Chapel's free speech
rights." The Court went on to dismiss the School District's claim that
allowing religious groups to use the government facilities would consti-
tute an establishment of religion."n Because allowing religious groups to
Clause, 1994 DET. C.L REv. 279 (1994).
102. Zobrest, 113 U.S. at 2466 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609
(1988)).
103. Id "(Gloverment programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of
citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establish-
ment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenu-
ated financial benefit." Id. (citing Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Muelier v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983)).
104. For a discussion of how attendance at a private religious school affects a
student's receipt of special education aid and the relevant Establishment Clause con-
cerns, see inftu notes 447-85 and accompanying text.
105. 113 S. Ct 2141 (1993). Justice Scalia's concurrence is particularly interesting for
its condemnation of the Lemon test. Id. at 2149 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia
likens the test to a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried." Id.
106. Id, at 2147.
107. Id at 2148; see also Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990)
(holding that the Equal Access Act of 1984, which prevented federally funded public
schools that provided a limited open forum to student groups from discriminating
among such groups based on religion, among other things, did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause and, therefore, such a school is required to allow student religious
groups to be recognized and hold meetings on campus on the same basis as nonreli-
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use the facilities posed "no realistic danger that the District was endors-
ing religion... and any benefit to religion or to [Lamb's Chapel] would
have been no more than incidental," the Court found that Lamb's
Chapel's use of the facilities, under neutral facility-use regulations,
passed the Lemon test and, hence, was constitutionally permissible."
3. Removal of Government Obstacles to Free Exercise
Establishment Clause cases frequently acknowledge that "government
may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and ... may
do so without violating the Establishment Clause."'" Disputes surround-
ing governmental accommodations of religious practices usually occur
when Free Exercise Clause"0 and Establishment Clause concerns arise
in the same case and the Court attempts to reconcile the competing
interests protected by the clauses without violating either."' Factually,
Grumet closely parallels Wisconsin v. Yoder, an important case which
focused on governmental accommodation of religion."2
Yoder, a Free Exercise Clause case,"3 involved the appeal of the con-
viction of Amish parents for violating Wisconsin's compulsory school
attendance law."4 The parents refused to send their children to public
school after the eighth grade because "their children's attendance at high
gious student groups).
108. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148. The Court found that allowing religious
groups to use the facilities would not violate the Lemon test. Id.
109. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,
2492 (1994); Hobble v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45
(1987); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970); see also Lupu, supra note 25
(discussing the interplay of separationism and accommodationist principles in Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence).
110. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
111. See TRIBE, supra note 25, at 1166-79 (exploring reconciliation of the religion
clauses through accommodation). "A pervasive difficulty in the constitutional jurispru-
dence of the religion clauses has . .. been the struggle 'to find a neutral course be-
tween the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either
of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other., Id.
at 1157 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69); see also Jessee H. Choper, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L REV. 673,
673 (1980) (evaluating the "ineluctable tension that exists between" the two religion
clauses); Jay Schlosser, Note, The Establishment Clause and Justice Scalia: What the
Future Holds for Church and State, 63 NOTRE DAmE L REV. 380, 380 (1988) (noting
that reconciliation of the two clauses is a crucial First Amendment problem).
112. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
113. The first two clauses of the First Amendment are known collectively as the re-
ligion clauses. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 1157. "[T~he Court has re-
viewed the claims under the different clauses on independent bases and has devel-
oped separate tests for determining whether a law violates either clause." Id.
114. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
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school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of
life."" The parents also complained that if their children attended high
school, the parents "would not only expose themselves to the danger of
the censure of the church community, but... also endanger their own
salvation and that of their children.""' In deciding the case, the Court
weighed the Anish's interest in preserving their right to free exercise of
religion, including the strong detrimental impact compelled high school
attendance would have on the Amish students and the Amish way of
life,"7 against the state's interest in preserving its system of compulsory
education."8 The Court held that the state's interest was not sufficiently
served by compelling the Amish children to attend high school given the
impact attendance would have on the Amish religion."' Furthermore,
the Court held that accommodating the Amish would not constitute an
establishment of religion.'
Yoder is an important part of the Establishment Clause picture be-
cause it represents a situation where the Court required a state to give
special treatment to a particular religious group based on that group's
rights under the Free Exercise Clause and held that such treatment
would not offend the Establishment Clause. Usually, as will be discussed
in the next section, special government treatment of groups based on
their religious affiliation results in an Establishment Clause violation.
Taken together, these three lines of Establishment Clause cases exem-
plify three principles underlying Establishment Clause doctrine: the gov-
ernment may not directly aid religious institutions; the government may
sweep religious institutions up into generally applicable government aid
programs; and the government may sometimes accommodate citizens'
free exercise of religion without running afoul of the Establishment
Clause.
B. Allocation of State Power Based on or in Support of Religion
The second area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence underlying the
115. Id. at 209.
116. Id
117. Id. at 216-19.
118. Id. at 221-26.
119. Id. at 221-29.
120. Id. at 234 n.22 (noting that "[a]ccommodating the religious beliefs of the Amish
can hardly be characterized as sponsorship or active involvement").
121. See infra notes 122-51 and accompanying text.
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Gramet decision involves governments that give special treatment to
groups because of their religious affiliation. What differentiates these
cases from those discussed in the previous section is that, while the
aforementioned cases usually involved direct or indirect financial support
of religious institutions by the state, these cases involve either admin-
istrative or symbolic preference of particular religious groups by the
state.12
The Court generally disfavors government attempts to confer special
civic powers on religious groups." Because the Massachusetts statute
at issue in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.'24 gave governing bodies of
churches "the power effectively to veto" the liquor license applications of
businesses within a 500-foot radius of the church which that body gov-
erned," the Court found that the statute violated the Establishment
122. For instance, at issue in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), Committee for
Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), and Levitt v. Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973), were aid programs
which directly benefitted private religious schools. Meek, 421 U.S. at 351-52; Nyquist,
413 U.S. at 761-62; Levitt, 413 U.S. at 474-76. At issue in cases discussed in this
sub-section, such as Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), and Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), on the other hand, were government acts which, in
the Court's view, placed governmental authority behind religious groups. Larkin, 459
U.S. at 117; Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. Thus, accumulation of state power based
on or in support of religion cases do not involve government aid programs, but rath-
er exercises of public authority in nonmonetary ways.
123. Such a conferral is usually viewed by the Court as violating the principle that
government must act neutrally towards religion, and "therefore crosses the line from
permissible accommodation to impermissible establishment" See Board of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2494 (1994):
124. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). The Grumet plurality relied primarily on Larkin to frame
its analysis. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2487-94. Chief Justice Rehnquist, a dissenter in
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Rehnquist, C.J., joining Scalia, J., dissenting), was the
lone dissenter in Larkin. 459 U.S. at 127 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Larkin, the
Chief Justice stated that the case was "silly" and that, for him, the statute at issue
represented a "sensible and unobjectionable" law. Id. at 128-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). This kind of attitude is similar to that taken by Justice Scalia regarding the
statute at issue in Grumet. 114 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that
"[t]he only thing distinctive about the school is that all the students share the same
religion"). Thus, a parallel can be extended not only between the reasoning used in
the two lead opinions, but also between the views the dissenters took towards the
statutes at issue in Grumet and Larkin.
125. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 117. The controversy which resulted in the Larkin case
came about when the operators of a restaurant, the back wall of which was only ten
feet away from the back of a Catholic parish, were denied a liquor license because
of the parish's objection to the license's issuance. Id. at 117-18; see Cynthia A. Krebs,
Recent Development, The Establishment Clause and Liquor Sales: The Supreme
Court Rushes in Where Angels Fear to Tread: Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 69 WASH. L
REV. 87 (1983) (commenting on the impact of the Larkin decision).
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Clause.i Despite passing the first Lemon prong, the statute failed
Lemon's second and third prongs "by delegating a governmental power
to religious institutions."12 The Court found that because churches
could use their power under the statute to further church interests, the
statute's primary effect was the advancement of religion.' This caused
the statute to fail Lemon's second prong." Also, because the statute
represented a "fusion of governmental and religious functions,"' it led
to an excessive entanglement between religious and state powers and,
accordingly, failed Lemon's third prong.31
In Edwards v. AguiUard, the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute
which required Creation-Science to be taught alongside Evolution-Science
in public schools.' The Court held that the statute violated the first
and second prongs of the Lemon test because it served no secular pur-
pose and had the primary purpose of advancing a particular religion."
According to the Court, the act's purpose and effect was to conform the
public school curriculum to a specific religious viewpoint.' Thus, the
statute violated the Establishment Clause.'3
126. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127.
127. Id. at 123.
128. Id. at 125-26.
129. Id. Because the statute conferred a veto power on churches that allowed them
to decide which businesses would be granted liquor licenses, that power could be
used "for explicitly religious goals." Id. at 125. Also, "the mere appearance of a joint
exercise of legislative authority by Church and State" would have the effect of ad-
vancing religion, in violation of Lemon's second prong. Id. at 125-26.
130. Id. at 126-27 (quoting District ol Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
222 (1963)). The Court found that the "statute enmeshes churches in the exercise of
substantial governmental powers contrary to our consistent interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause; '[tihe objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of
either [Church or State] into the precincts of the other.'" Id. at 126 (quoting Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
131. Id. at 127. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, remarked that
"[oIrdinary human experience and a long line of cases teach that few entanglements
could be more offensive to the spirit of the Constitution" than the one at issue in
Larkin. Id.
132. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
133. Id. at 596-97.
134. Id. at 585-94.
135. Id. at 593.
136. Id. at 597; see N. S. Fletcher, Recent Development, Edwards v. Aguillard: The
Evolution of Secular Purpose in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 62 TuL L REV.
261 (1987); Laurie B. Halpern, Note, Edwards v. Aguillard. The Supreme Court Evalu-
ates the Sincerity of the Louisiana Legislature, 34 LoY. L REV. 406 (1988); Van F.
McClellan, Comment, Edwards v. Aguillard The Creationist-Evolutionist Battle Con-
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While cases like Larkin and Edwards dealt with statutes that allowed
religious groups to participate in the government's performance of public
functions, the cases that follow assess whether a state actor endorses
religion or compels participation in religious exercises when it engages in
the conduct at issue.'
County of Allegheny v. ACL U- involved two winter holiday displays
situated on public property in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania." The unconsti-
tutional display consisted of a creche located on the Grand Staircase of
the Allegheny County Courthouse." The constitutionally permissible
display consisted of a Christmas tree, a "sign saluting liberty," and a
menorah located outside Allegheny's City-County Building."' In its anal-
ysis, the Court focused on the principle, inherent in Lemon's prohibition
of a primary effect of aiding or advancing religion, that the Establishment
Clause prohibits a state from endorsing a particular religion or endorsing
religion over nonreligion."
ITIhis Court has come to understand the Establishment Clause to mean that gov-
ernment may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or organi-
zation, may not discriminate among persons on the basis of their religious beliefs
and practices, may not delegate a governmental power to a religious institution,
and may not involve itself too deeply in such an institution's affairs."I
Applying this endorsement approach, the Court found that the creche's
celebration of Christmas in a solely Christian manner effectively en-
tinues, 13 OKLA. Crr, U. L REv. 631 (1988); Sherrl Schaeffer, Note, Edwards v.
Aguillard: Creation Science and Evolution-The Fall of Balanced Treatment Acts in
the Public Schools, 25 SAN DIEGO L REv. 829 (1988).
137. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 673, 592-93 (1989); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a discussion of Justice
O'Connor's separate endorsement test, see infra notes 316-29 and accompanying text.
138. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
139. Id. at 578-79; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). In Lynch, the
Court found that the inclusion of a crbche in a city's Christmas display was not an
unconstitutional establishment of religion. Id. at 687. Lynch laid the framework for
the Court's analysis in Allegheny, especially Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Lynch which introduced her variation on Lemon based on endorsement principles. Id.
at 687-90; see infra notes 316-29 and accompanying text; see also Joshua D. Zarrow,
Comment, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly Sponsored
Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U. L REV. 477 (1986) (examining the evolution
of the Court's treatment of public religious symbol displays).
140. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578-79.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 592-93. The Court noted this concern for endorsement as falling under
the second, effects prong of the Lemon test Id. Thus, while the Court generally
framed its analysis around the Lemon test, the notion of endorsement emerged as the
central basis upon which its decision rested. See James M. Lewis & Michael L Vild,
Note, A Controvemial Twist of Lemon The Endorsement Test as the Establishment
Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME L REv. 671 (1990).
143. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590.
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dorsed Christianity and violated Lemon's second prong.'" In contrast,
the menorah display's inclusion of other holiday symbols created a per-
missible "overall holiday setting" that represented "both Christmas and
Chanukah," and thus did not impermissibly endorse one religion in viola-
tion of Lemon's second prong.'
Finally, in Lee v. Weisman,'" the Court found that the inclusion of
invocations and benedictions in a public high school's graduation cere-
mony violated the Establishment Clause without relying on the Lemon
test."7 "These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our de-
cision: State officials direct the performance of a formal religious exer-
cise .... Even for those students who object to the religious exercise,
their attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity
are in a fair and real sense obligatory .... ."'" The Court's decision
rested upon "prayer in school" precedent and the need to preserve
the state's detachment from religious decisions and sponsorships in or-
der to prevent government from coercing citizens to adopt or participate
in religious beliefs or practices."" In addition, the Court observed that
144. Id. at 601-02.
145. Id. at 614.
146. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
147. Id. at 2652-67. An incredible number of commentaries were generated by the
Lee opinion because of its ramifications for the prayer in school issue, its effect on
the Lemon test, and Justice Kennedy's use of his coercion test, among other things.
See, e.g., Dina F. El-Sayed, What is the Court Trying to Establish?: An Analysis of
Lee v. Weisman, 21 HASTINGS CONsT. LQ. 441 (1994); Timothy C. Caress, Note, Is
Justice Kennedy the Supreme Court's Lone Advocate for the Coercion Element in Es-
tablishment Clause Jurisprudence? An Analysis of Lee v.Weisman, 27 IND. L REV.
475 (1993); Paula S. Cohen, Comment, Psycho-Coercion, A New Establishment Clause
Test: Lee v. Weisman and its Initial Effect, 73 B.U. L REv. 501 (1993); Marilyn
Perrin, Note, Lee v. Weisman: Unanswered Prayers, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 207 (1993);
Kevin E. Broyles, Recent Development, Establishment of Religion and High School
Graduation Ceremonies, 16 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 279 (1993).
148. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
149. Inclusion of the invocations and benedictions "conflicts with settled rules per-
taining to prayer exercises for students, and that suffices to determine the question
before us." Id. at 2655. Thus, Lemon was neither applied nor rejected by the Court
in Weisman. Id. In District of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court held uncon-
stitutional the opening of public school days with Bible readings from which students
could be excused by their parents. 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). Later, in Wallace v.
Jaffree, the Court invalidated a moment of silence for "meditation or voluntary
prayer" in public schools. 472 U.S. 38, 41-42, 60 (1985).
150. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655-61; see Paulsen, supra note 31 (analyzing the fu-
tore role of Justice Kennedy's coercion test); Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion
and the Establishment of Religion: The Beginning of the End to the Wandering of a
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the prayer's inclusion in the graduation ceremony effectively compelled
students' participation in a religious exercise.'
While the facts of these two kinds of cases within the area of alloca-
tion of state power in support of religion are distinguishable, the Consti-
tution is violated by the rules at issue because they allow religious
groups to step too far into the public arena and, as a result, exercise
governmental authority or receive the government's endorsement in vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause.
In summary, these two lines of authority in Establishment Clause cas-
es, state aid to religious institutions cases and allocation of state power
on the basis of religion cases, represent the roadmap before the Court in
Grumet. Four general principles are discernible from these cases: the
government may not directly aid or entangle itself with religion; the gov-
ernment may promulgate neutral aid schemes from which religion may
incidentally benefit; the government may not delegate its power to reli-
gious groups; and the government may not endorse a particular religion.
Grumet turned on which of these principles the New York legislature
invoked when it attempted to accommodate disabled children in the
Village of Kiryas Joel.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
A. The Village of Kiryas Joel
During the early twentieth century, the Satmar Hasidic sect of Judaism
was formed by Grand Rebbe Joel Teitelbaum in the Hungarian town
from which the sect takes its name." Following World War II, the
Grand Rebbe and his followers immigrated to the United States and set-
tied in Brooklyn, New York. 3 In the early 1970s, the Satmars began
forming what is now known as the Village of Kiryas Joel'" (the Village)
in the town of Monroe, New York. New York's Village Law allowed
Wayward Judiciary?, 43 CASE W. REs. L REv. 917 (1993) (same); see also Ronald C.
Kahn, God Save Us From the Coercion Test: Constitutive Decisionmaking, Polity,
Principles, and Religious Freedom, 43 CASE W. RES. L REv. 983 (1933) (rejecting
Dean Smith and Professor Paulsen's analysis of the potential effects and benefits of
the coercion test).
151. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2660.
152. Board of Educ. of Klryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct 2481,
2485 (1994).
153. Id.
154. Id. The Village of Kiryas Joel, 'roughly translated means 'Community of JoeL'"
Decision on Sufficiency of Petition, Joint Appendix at 8, Board of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 &
93-539).
155. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
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groups who completed the necessary procedures to form a new village
within an existing town." In 1977, the Village incorporated under this
156. Id.; see N.Y. VULAGE LAW §§ 2-200 to -258 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1994). The
traditional reasons for the formation of a village within a town in New York were
"the desire and need of residents of a more densely populated area for municipal
services which in the past were usually not available at the hands of the Town or
County." Decision on Sufficiency of Petition, Joint Appendix at 9. Because these ser-
vices, such as water supply, police and fire protection, and sewer systems, are now
provided by the town and county in New York, "the need for self-incorporation into
villages has, for the most part, disappeared." Id. When it sought incorporation, the
Village was already receiving these services and so its desire to incorporate was
atypical. Id. at 9-10. The Town of Monroe's (Monroe) zoning ordinances prohibited
the Satmar from converting the buildings in the Monwood area of the town, where
the Satmar purchased property to form a community and later did form the Village,
into the kind of dwellings they desired. Id. at 11. This lead to a dispute between the
Satmar and Monroe. Id. at 11-13. As a result of this somewhat lengthy and bitter
dispute, the Satmar petitioned to form a new village. Id. at 12. The boundaries of the
new village included many non-Satmar landowners who opposed incorporation, as did
Monroe's town board. Id. After more dispute between the landowners, the town
board, and the Satmars, the parties agreed to a smaller village. Id. at 13. Commenting
on this compromise, Monroe's Supervisor noted that:
To me, and I believe to the Town Board, the compromise is almost as dis-
tasteful as the dispute it settled. The Satmar Hasidim has taken advantage of
an obviously archaic State statute to slip away from the Town's enforcement
program without the Town having the slightest possibility of commenting on
the inappropriate reasons for formation of the new village. Were the village
proposed prior to the accusations or after they were adjudicated, it would be
a different matter, but to utilize the self incorporation procedure during the
pendency of a vigorously litigated issue in which the Town has accused the
Satmar community of serious and flagrant violations of its Zoning Law, is
almost sinister and surely an abuse of the right of self incorporation.
Id. at 13-14. Despite these objections, the requirements of the Village Law were met
and the Village was permitted to incorporate. Id. at 14-16. Perhaps somewhat ironically,
the Supervisor added these words at the end of his decision regarding the Village's
incorporation:
With this approval I hope a new era of well being will spring up between
the Satmar community and the rest of Monroe .... For the Satmars to
believe that they are above or separate from the rules and regulations that
Monroe has chosen to live by or try to impose their own mores upon the
community of Monroe, or to hide behind the self-imposed shade of secrecy
or cry out religious persecution when there is none, will only lead to more
confrontations as bitter as the one this decision purports to resolve.
Id. at 15-16. In Grumet, the Court did not scrutinize the actual formation of the Village
under the Establishment Clause. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2485. Justice Scalia, howev-
er, pointed out that other religiously homogeneous counties, and probably also cities,
exist throughout the United States. Id. at 2508 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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law."7 At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Grumet, the Vil-
lage population totaled about 8,500."i
Satmar Hasidism is an ultraorthodox form of Judaism.' "The Satmar
sect is the most conservative and traditional of the Hasidic" Jews.'6
The Talmud' guides all aspects of the Satmars' life "from dress to
diet."" Village residents are "vigorously religious people who make few
concessions to the modem world and go to great lengths to avoid assimi-
lation into it."" Regarding education, children attend private schools
within the Village." Strict separation between the sexes is practiced by
the Satmars in almost all social settings, school notwithstanding."® Boys
attend the United Talmudic Academy and receive extensive instruction in
the Torah and minimal introductions to secular subjects." Girls attend
Bais Rochel where they are prepared for their lives as wives and moth-
ers.' 7 Since its incorporation, the Village has faced numerous legal bat-
tles regarding the education of its children."
157. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2485-86. Justice O'Connor, in her Grumet concurrence,
characterized the Village's incorporation as a response to the fact that the Satmar's
"traditionally close-knit extended family" structure was incompatible with Monroe's
zoning ordinances, as were the Satmar's use of homes as schools and synagogues. Id.
at 2495-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She went on to characterize the village incorpo-
ration law used by the Satmars to incorporate as a fortunate accommodation of the
Satmar's special needs. Id. at 2496 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
158. Id. at 2485.
159. Id, at 2484-85.
160. Respondents' Brief at 1, Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994) (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 & 93-539).
161. The Talmud is the Jewish book of law and tradition. Id.
162. Id
163. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
164. Id.
165. Respondents' Brief at 2. Gender separation is not required between immediate
family members or between children with disabilities. Id.
166. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.
167. Id
168. See Parents' Ass'n. v. Quinones, 803 F.2d 1235 (2d Cir. 1986) (reversing denial
of preliminary injunction preventing implementation of a separate special education
program, detached from the school's general population, for female Satmar children
of the Village in a public school, as a violation of the Establishment Clause);
Bollenbach v. Board of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Central Sch. Dist., 659 F. Supp
1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that the manipulation of public school bus drivers' rout-
ing schedules in a manner contrary to the district busing program in order that only
male drivers serviced the male Satmar children of the Village violated the Establish-
ment Clause); Board of Educ. of the Monroe-Woodbury Central Sch. Dist. v. Wieder,
72 N.Y.2d 174 (1988) (holding that the Monroe-Woodbury District was not compelled
to offer special education services to the Satmar children of the Village in regular
classes at public schools, nor was it compelled to offer the services at the children's
private schools or at a neutral cite within the Village).
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B. Attempts to Provide Special Education Services for
Satmar Children Prior to the Creation of the
Kiryas Joel Village School District
Federal and State law required the Board of Education of the
Monroe-Woodbury Central School District (hereinafter "the
Monroe-Woodbury District)-within which the Village was wholly con-
tained prior to the creation of the Kiryas Joel Village School District
(hereinafter "the Kiryas Joel District")-to provide special education ser-
vices to qualifying disabled Village children. 6 ' Originally, the
Monroe-Woodbury District furnished "health and welfare" services to the
Village children at a "neutral site" which annexed Bais Rochel."0 How-
ever, in 1985, the Monroe-Woodbury District ceased providing the servic-
es at the neutral cite and began furnishing them only at the district's
public schools.7' The Monroe-Woodbury District took this action in re-
sponse to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Aguilar v.
Felton and Grand Rapids School District v. Ball." After sending their
children to public schools to receive the services for a time, the disabled
children's parents refused to continue to send them outside the Village to
the public school because of the "panic, fear and trauma (the children)
suffered in leaving their own community and being with people whose
ways were so different." "
169. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d at 178; Petitioner Attorney General of the State of New
York's Brief at 5, Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet (Nos.
93-517, 93-527 & 93-539). The relevant statutes were the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1485 (1988), and N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 4401 et
seq. (1981 & Supp. 1994). Petitioner Attorney General of the State of New York's
Brief at 5 n.2. The IDEA requires that both private religious and nonreligious school
students receive the mandated state aid. Petitioner Board of Education of the
Monroe-Woodbury Central School District's Brief at 28, Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 & 93-539); see infra notes 454-60
and accompanying text (discussing the IDEA).
170. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d at 180 (citing N.Y. EDUc. LAW §912 (1988)). About 150
Satmar children received these services at the time of the Wieder action. Id. at 179.
The physical and educational learning services aided children with disabilities such as
"mental retardation, deafness, speech and language impairments, emotional disorders,
learning disabilities, Down's syndrome, spina bifida and cerebral palsy." Id.
171. Id. at 180.
172. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,
2485 (1994). The provision of education services on-site at private sectarian schools
was found to violate the Establishment Clause in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414
(1985), and School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397
(1985). See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
173. Wieder, 72 N.Y.2d at 180-81. One Satmar girl, attending public school, "was
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In Board of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School Dis-
trict v. Wieder,74 the Monroe Woodbury District sought a judgment de-
claring that these special education services could only be provided in
"regular public school classes and programs," while the parents of the
Village children counterclaimed, demanding a declaration that the district
must provide the services "on the premises of the school the children
attend for their normal educational instruction.""78 The Court of Appeals
of New York held that the state statute which required provision of the
special services' did not compel the Monroe-Woodbury District to pro-
vide the services in the Village's nonpublic schools or at a neutral site,
nor did it compel the Monroe-Woodbury District to only offer the servic-
es at the public schools.'"
The Monroe-Woodbury District continued to offer the services only at
the public schools to which the Village parents continued to refuse to
send their disabled children.78 As time progressed, only one Village
child attended the Monroe-Woodbury District public schools and "the
village's other handicapped children received privately funded special
services or went without."'1
C. Creation of the Village of Kiryas Joel School District
Responding to pressure from the Satmar parents who were dissatisfied
with the Monroe-Woodbury District's policy, the New York legislature
passed Chapter 748 of the Laws of 1989 (Chapter 748), which provided
that the Village constituted a separate school district, the Kiryas Joel
District, to be run by locally-elected board members."n The Kiryas Joel
once cast in a Christmas-season skit, as Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer." Joan
Biskupic, School District for Hasidim is Target of High Court Chalenge, WASH.
POST, March 28, 1994, at A4.
174. 72 N.Y.2d 174 (1988).
175. Id. at 178-79.
176. Id. at 181.
177. Id. at 189-90.
178. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,
2486 (1994).
179. Id.
180. Petitioner Attorney General of the State of New York's Brief at 5; 1989 N.Y.
Laws 748. Chapter 748 provided, in part:
The territory of the village of Kiryas Joel in the town of Monroe, Orange
county.... shall be and hereby is constituted a separate school district, and
shall be known as the Ki-yas Joel village school district and shall have and
enjoy all the powers and duties of a union free school district under the
provisions of the education law .... Such district shall be under control of
a board of education, which shall be composed of from five to nine mem-
bers elected by the qualified voters of the village of Kiryas Joel, said mem-
bers to serve for terms not exceeding five years.
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District operated one public school which provided special education
services to the disabled Village students. 8" By statute, the district was
obliged to operate in a secular manner, which included following the
public school calendar and conducting classes in a co-ed setting."u
1989 N.Y. Laws 748. Under the statute, the Kiryas Joel District could "take such action
as opening schools and closing them, hiring teachers, prescribing textbooks, establish-
ing disciplinary rules, and raising property taxes to fund operation." Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
at 2486 (citing N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 1709 (McKinney 1988)). Urging passage of this stat-
ute, its sponsor commented: "In an honest. attempt to tolerate access for a group of
children, the Monroe-Woodbury School Board voted unanimously in favor of this bill;
and the local newspaper in an eloquent editorial acknowledged efforts by all parties to
try to solve the problem and, therefore, wholeheartedly offered its support." Letter
from Assemblyman Joseph R. Lentol to Governor Mario Cuomo (July 7, 1989) (Joint
Appendix at 19, Grumet (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 & 539)); see also Letter from Daniel Alex-
ander, Superintendent of Schools, to Evan Davis, Counsel to the. Governor (July 12,
1989) (Joint Appendix at 21, Grumet (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 & 93-539)) (urging approval
of Chapter 748 and noting endorsement of the measure by the school board of the
Monroe-Woodbury Central School District). New York Governor Mario Cuomo acknowl-
edged the fact that all of the District's residents were Satmars, but said the bill repre-
sented "a good faith effort to solve this unique problem." Memorandum Filed With As-
sembly Bill Number 8747, Joint Appendix at 41, Grumet (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 & 93-539).
For a discussion of the election of the Kiryas Joel District school board and the con-
troversy that surrounded the election, see Brief for the Committee for the Well-Being
of Kiryas Joel at 4-10, Grumet (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 & 93-539); Respondents' Brief at 2,
Grumet (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 & 93-539); Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6, Grumet (Nos.
93-517, 93-527 & 93-539).
181. Petitioner Attorney General of the State of New York's Brief at 5, Grumet
(Nos. 93-517, 93-527 & 93-539). The school is "physically separate and apart" from the
private religious schools in the Village. Petitioner Board of Education of the
Monroe-Woodbury Central School District's Brief at 6.
182. See Petitioner Attorney General of the State of New York's Brief at 5, 18. "The
school, like any public school, must have no religious symbols in it. It must operate
on the same school calendar as every other district in the area. This sometimes
means that the school must be open on Jewish holidays and closed on Christian holi-
days, such as Christmas." Id. at 18; see also Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The school was staffed "on a non-sectarian basis" and followed
state-prescribed curriculum. Petitioner Board of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury
Central School District's Brief at i. The Kiryas Joel District Superintendent was not
Hasidic. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
On the other hand, The Washington Post reported on an all-girl music class at
the Kiryas Joel District public school where boys were not allowed because "the
Satmars forbade girls to sing and dance with boys." Biskupic, supra note 173, at A4.
Also reported were other sex-segregated classes and a kosher cafeteria. Id. For ac-
counts of school-life at the Kiryas Joel District public school and public reaction to
the school, see Geraldine Baum, Crossing the Line? A School for Disabled Hasidic
Children Has Some Worried About Separation of Church and State, LA. TIMES, Dec.
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Upon enactment of the statute, Louis Grumet and Albert W. Hawk, as
citizen taxpayers, and as Executive Director of the New York State
School Boards Association, Inc. and President of the New York State
School Boards Association, Inc., respectively, brought a declaratory judg-
ment action in the New York State Supreme Court, challenging Chapter
748 as a violation of the United States and New York constitutions, alleg-
ing that the statute constituted an unconstitutional establishment of reli-
gion. 18
D. Grumet in the Lower Courts
An analysis of the New York courts' treatment of Board of Education
of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet Tu is instructive for two
reasons. First, the opinions demonstrate that Lemon remained, before
Grumet, a test upon which lower courts relied when adjudicating Estab-
lishment Clause controversies. Second, this reliance on Lemon, after an
analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Grumet, appears mis-
placed.'" These points reinforce the Court's recent inability, which con-
tinued in Grumet, to indicate to lower courts the appropriate framework
within which to decide Establishment Clause cases.M
The Supreme Court of New York held that Chapter 748 violated the
Establishment Clause.' After noting the muddled character of the Su-
preme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence,"s the court applied
the Lemon test and found that Chapter 748 violated all three prongs."
According to the court, Chapter 748 lacked a secular purpose, in viola-
tion of the first prong, because it, "rather than serving a legitimate gov-
19, 1993, at El; Biskupic, supra note 173, at A4; Tony Mauro, Church-State Debate
Invades Hasidic "Island": Jewish Group's School Gets Tax Funds, USA TODAY, March
29, 1994, at A2.
183. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618 N.E.2d 94,
97-98 (N.Y. 1993); U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 3. Later, the Court of
Appeals modified the Appellate Division's finding of a state constitutional violation
and declined to reach that issue. Petitioner Attorney General of the State of New
York's Brief at 9.
At the time of the grant of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, the defendants
in the action were the Board of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School
District, the Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District and the
Attorney General of the State of New York, who appeared, as required by statute, to
defend Chapter 748's constitutionality. Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 97-98.
184. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
185. See infra note 208.
186. See ifra notes 400-15 and accompanying text.
187. Grumet v. New York State Educ. Dept., 579 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992).
188. Il at 1007.
189. I&
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ernmental end, was enacted to meet exclusive religious needs."" The
statute had the primary effect of advancing religion, in violation of the
second prong, because the District represented "an attempt to camou-
flage, with secular garments, a religious community as a public school
district."' Regarding Lemon's third prong, the court noted that New
York, "in its monitoring capacity [of the district] is unavoidably entangled
in matters of religion."' Thus, according to the court, Chapter 748
would foster excessive government entanglement with religion and vio-
late Lemon's third prong."
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court also found
that Chapter 748 violated the Establishment Clause." The court, apply-
ing the Lemon test, found that the statute probably lacked a secular pur-
pose, in violation of Lemon's first prong, because, as the children were
already entitled to take advantage of the services at the Monroe-
Woodbury District schools, the statute's only purpose was to ensure
"that the children would remain subject to the language, lifestyle and
environment created by the community of Satmar Hasidim and avoid
mixing with children whose language, lifestyle, and environment are not
the product of that religion."'" Analyzing the second prong, the court
found that because Chapter 748 authorized a religious community to con-
trol secular education services, it represented an endorsement of religion,
the primary effect of which would be to enhance religion." The court
did not consider the third Lemon prong."
The Court of Appeals of New York also framed its analysis around the
Lemon test, but addressed only the second prong because Chapter 748
"clearly violated" the prong's requirement that advancement of religion is
not the law's primary effect." The court relied on the Supreme Court's
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sc&. Dist, 592 N.Y.S.2d
123, 126 (1992).
195. Id. at 127.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 129-30.
198. Grumet v. Board of Educ. of the Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 618 N.E.2d 94,
99 (1993).
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recent formulations of the second prong, which focused on whether,
given the context of the government action, the "action [was] likely to be
perceived as an endorsement of religion.""
Because special services are already available to the handicapped children of [the
Village], the primary effect of chapter 748 is not to provide those services, but to
yield to the demands of a religious community whose separatist tenets create a
tension between the needs of its handicapped children and the need to adhere to
certain religious practices.m*
Thus, the court found that Chapter 748 violated the Establishment
Clause."I
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether Chapter 748 violated the Establishment Clause.'
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPINIONS
A. Justice Souter's Plurality Opinion
Justice Souter, delivering the plurality opinion,' began his analysis
by noting that "[a] proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the
Establishment Clauses compels the State to pursue a course of
'neutrality' toward religion... ."' Chapter 748 violated the principle of
government neutrality towards religion because it delegated governmen-
tal authority "to a group defined by its character as a religious communi-
ty, in a legal and historical context that gives no assurance that govern-
199. Id. (citing Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-97 (1989)).
200. Id. at 101.
201. Id
202. 114 S. Ct. 544 (1993).
203. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,
2484 (1994). No part of Justice Souter's opinion received the support of a majority of
justices. Justices Blaclnun, Stevens, Ginsburg, and O'Connor joined Justice Souter in
various parts of his opinion and thus every part of the opinion received four Justices'
support. Justices Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor concurred in Part I (factual back-
ground), fl-B (Chapter 748 suspect because it did not ensure the special treatment
given to the Village would be given to other similar groups), II-C (principle of accom-
modation is not abandoned because other alternatives exist for the Satmars), and III
(rejection of the dissent's approach). Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Ginsburg con-
cuffed in Part il-introduction (overview of applicable law and framework for analy-
sis), and II-A (Chapter 748 represented impermissible fusion of civic and religious
authority). Justice Kennedy, however, withheld his support from the Court's opinion
and, while concurring in the result, relied entirely on his own opinion to explain his
vote. Id. at 2500-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
204. Id, at 2487 (quoting Committee for 'Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973)). See infir notes 428-38 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the effect of Grumet on the Court's delineation between Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause cases.
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mental power has been or will be exercised neutrally."ml Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc.,2" according to Justice Souter, controlled the
Court's decision in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet.' Both the Larkin and Grumet statutes involved a
"fusion of governmental and religious functions""' and did not guaran-
tee "that the delegated power '(would) be used exclusively for secular,
neutral, and nonideological purposes.'"" Justice Souter's analysis fo-
cused on Chapter 748's delegation of a governmental function to a re-
ligious group, and its lack of assurance that such a provision would not
be granted to other similarly situated groups.
1. Delegation of a Governmental Function to a Religious Group
"[A] state may not delegate its civic authority to a group chosen ac-
cording to religious criteria."210 For Justice Souter, this is the rule under
which Larkin and Grumet similarly violated the Establishment
Clause.21' Justice Souter dismissed the distinction between Larkin's di-
rect delegation of governmental power to religious groups and Grumet's
delegation of governmental power to the Village voters.2 12 He admitted
that Grumet did not involve the kind of "straightforward" delegation of
civic power to a religious group that was at issue in Larkin."' But for
Justice Souter, the difference between delegating governmental authority
205. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2487.
206. 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (holding that a Massachusetts statute giving religious bod-
ies veto power over the granting of state liquor licenses violated the Establishment
Clause); see supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text
207. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2487.
208. Id. at 2488 (quoting Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126). This fusion occurred "by delegat-
ing 'important, discretionary governmental powers' to religious bodies, and thus
impermissibly entangling government and religion." Id. (quoting Larkin, 459 U.S. at
126-27). This contention was also supported by a citation to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971), one of only two references to Lemon in Justice Souter's entire opin-
ion. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2488 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. 602). Justice Souter also used
Lemon as a citation to support his analysis of how, in Larkin, the delegation of gov-
ernmental function to a religious body failed to ensure that the power would be used
neutrally and would lead to a symbolic benefit to religion, thus the primary effect of
such a delegation would be to advance religion. Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. 602).
209. Id, at 2488 (quoting Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. I&
213. Id.
to the Village voters and delegating it to a religious group as such was
"one of form, not substance."21 4
With this distinction between Grumet and Larkin removed, Justice
Souter next analyzed how Chapter 748 represented the kind of impermis-
sible delegation of government authority that was found to violate the
Establishment Clause in Larkin. The New York legislature limited the
district to Satmars and thus delegated exclusive control over the govern-
mental function of public education in that district to a religious
group."' Despite Chapter 748's lack of mention of the Village residents'
religion, Justice Souter found the context of Chapter 748's enactment
demonstrated that the statute nevertheless "identified [the district mem-
bers] by reference to doctrinal adherence."28 Thus, Justice Souter con-
cluded that the creation of the Kiryas Joel District via Chapter 748 was
"substantially equivalent to defining a political subdivision and hence the
qualification for its franchise by a religious test, resulting in a purposeful
and forbidden 'fusion of governmental and religious functions.'"2"
2. Lack of Insurance That Governmental Power was
Neutrally Conferred
Justice Souter's opinion next expressed concern over Chapter 748's
214. Id.
215. Id. "Authority over public schools belongs to the State." Id. While Justice
Souter admitted that members of a religious group could not be denied their rights
as citizens based on their religious affiliations under the Free Exercise clause, he
explained that there is a difference between "purposeful delegation on the basis of
religion and a delegation on principles neutral to religion, to individuals whose reli-
gious identities are incidental to their receipt of civic authority." Id. at 2489. Justice
Souter did not explain any further why Chapter 748 fell into the former and not the
latter category, but rather discussed Chapter 748's facial neutrality towards the
Satmar religion. Id.
216. Id. at 2489. The Court found "this to be the better view of the facts because
of the way the boundary lines of the school district divide residents according to
religious affiliation, under the terms of an unusual and special legislative act" Id.
Justice Souter then offered an account of the circumstances surrounding Chapter
748's enactment, emphasizing that it was undisputed that the Village was drawn to
include only Satmars. Id. The Court emphasized that the Kiryas Joel District was
created within an existing district "counter to customary districting practices in the
State" which tended to consolidate, rather than divide, districts. Id. at 2489-90. Also,
the Court noted that districts are usually created under general laws of district reor-
ganization rather than by special act of the legislature. Id. at 2490. These facts led
the Court to conclude that the Kiryas Joel District was "exceptional to the point of
singularity .. . [and so] we have good reasons to treat this district as the reflection
of a religious criterion for identifying the recipients of civil authority." Id.
217. Id, at 2490. (quoting Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126). For a discussion of Justice
Souter's reliance on "fusion" as the mark of the impermissible intersection between
church and state see infra notes 340-62 and accompanying text.
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special treatment of the Satmar community."8 In Larkin, the "absence
of an 'effective means of guaranteeing' that governmental power will be
and has been neutrally employed" was key to the unconstitutionality of
the statute at issue."' Similarly, in Grurmet, Justice Souter pointed out,
no guarantee existed that New York would exercise its power in favor of
and confer special benefits on other groups as it did the Satmars.ra
Hence, the statute did not assure the Court that "governmental power
will be and has been neutrally employed," " a key principle underlying
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.' 2
Thus, Justice Souter concluded that because it delegated governmental
power on a religious basis, resulting in an impermissible fusion of gov-
ernmental and religious authority, and gave no assurance that this special
power would be neutrally or consistently conferred upon other groups,
Chapter 748 violated the Establishment Clause.'m
3. Accommodation, Alternatives, and Neutrality
In the final parts of his opinion, Justice Souter contended that his
opinion did not: reject the permissibility of governmental accommodation
of religion; foreclose all of the Satmars' means of obtaining special edu-
cation services; or prevent religiously homogeneous groups from exercis-
ing political power. '
Justice Souter emphasized that neither New York's accommodation of
the Satmars' religious needs nor its facilitation of their religious practices
218. Grumet, 114 U.S. at 2491.
219. Id. (quoting Larldn v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982)).
220. Id. This failure was especially problematic for Justice Souter because
[tihe anomalously case-specific nature of the legislature's exercise of state
authority in creating this district for a religious community leaves the Court
without any direct way to review such a state action for the purpose of safe-
guarding a principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause, that govern-
ment should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.
Id.
221. Il
222. Id Justice Souter stated that the principle of neutrality "is well grounded in
our case law, as we have frequently relied explicitly on the general availability of any
benefit provided religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause
challenges." Id. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
223. Id. at 2492.
224. Id. at 2492-94. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor joined in these parts
of the opinion.
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rendered the statute unconstitutional.' Rather, New York's singling out
of the Satmar sect for special treatment caused the statute's downfall.m
According to Justice Souter, other alternatives available to New York
to alleviate the Satmars' concern over sending their disabled children to
public schools included offering the services at a Monroe-Woodbury
District public school 7 or at a "neutral site near one of the village's pa-
rochial schools." ' If either of these alternatives did not produce a sat-
isfactory result, parents could seek administrative review of the pro-
grams." In addition, if these alternatives failed to produce appropriate
programs, the New York legislature could "certainly enact general legisla-
tion tightening the mandate to school districts on matters of special edu-
cation or bilingual and bicultural offerings."m
Finally, Justice Souter emphasized that the Court's opinion must not
be interpreted as preventing a religious group from exercising
neutrally-conferred political power. 1 Rather, Justice Souter reiterated,
Chapter 748 "fail[ed] the test of neutrality" and therefore constituted an
"impermissible establishment" of religion.=
225. Id. at 2492. "[W]e do not deny that the Constitution allows the state to accom-
modate religious needs by alleviating special burdens .... [T]here is ample room
under the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.'" Id. (quoting Corpora-
tion of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 334 (1987)). Regarding the principle of accommodation in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
226. Grunmet, 114 S. Ct. at 2492-93. "[A]ccommodation is not a principle without
limits, and what petitioners seek is an adjustment to the Satmars' religiously ground-
ed preferences that our cases do not countenance." Id. Justice Souter emphasized
that there is a difference between allowing religious groups to "pursue their own
interests free from governmental interference" and delegating governmental power to
religious groups. Id. at 2493. For Justice Souter, the principle of neutrality towards
religious groups mandates that such a delegation, or fusion, cannot occur. Id.
227. But see supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text
228. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2493. Justice Souter suggested that providing services at
a neutral cite is sanctioned by the Court's decision in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 247-48 (1977). Id.; see supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text
229. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2493.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2493-94. Taking issue with Justice Scalia's dissent, Justice Souter again
emphasized that the Court's decision was not designed to prevent religiously homoge-
neous communities from exercising their political rights. Id. Justice Souter stated that
the Court did not reject the motive of New York legislature to accommodate the
Satmars, but rather the Legislature's method of accomplishing such accommodation
through religion-specific, rather than generally applicable, legislation. Id. at 2494.
232. Id Rejecting the dissent's approach to the Establishment Clause, Justice Souter
proclaimed:
Our job, of course would be easier if the dissent's position had prevailed
with the Framers and with this Court over the years. An Establishment
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B. Justice Blackmun's Concurrence
In his brief concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun expressed his view
that the Grumet decision did not equate to a departure from the princi-
ples of Lemon v. Kurtzman.' Justice Blackmun also reaffirmed his
personal adherence to Lemon's principles.'
C. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens' concurrence' emphasized that Chapter 748 estab-
lished, and did not accommodate, religion.' Justice Stevens reasoned
that to alleviate the "panic, fear and trauma" suffered by the Satmar
children when attending the Monroe-Woodbury District's public schools,
New York could have taught the children's "schoolmates to be tolerant
and respectful of Satmar customs." 7 But by creating the Kiryas Joel
District, the State instead "provided official support to cement the attach-
ment of young adherents to a particular faith."' As such, according to
Justice Stevens, Chapter 748 impermissibly created an establishment of
religion.'
D. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
In her detailed concurrence, Justice O'Connor dealt with what, for her,
Clause diminished to the dimensions acceptable to Justice Scalia could be
enforced by a few simple rules .... But that would be as blind to history
as to precedent, and the difference between Justice Scalia and the Court
accordingly turns on the Court's recognition that the Establishment Clause
does comprehend such a principle and obligates the courts to exercise the
judgment necessary to apply it.
Id.
233. Id. at 2494-95 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971)). No other Justices joined in Justice Blackmun's opinion.
234. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) Thus, Justice Blackmun stood in this, the last of
his Establishment Clause decisions on the Court, as Lemon's lone adherent Id.
(Blackmun, J., concurring)
235. Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg joined in
Justice Stevens' concurrence.
236. Id.
237. Id. For Justice Stevens, "[aiction of that kind would raise no constitutional
concerns and would further the strong public interest in promoting diversity and
understanding in the public schools." Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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was the central issue in Grumet "What may the govenment do, consis-
tently with the Establishment Clause, to accommodate people's religious
beliefs?"'
Justice O'Connor's concurrence began with a catalogue of what she
viewed as the Satmars' "three accommodation problems. " "4 The first
problem involved the City of Monroe's zoning laws, which did not permit
the Satmars' unique living arrangements.M The neutral village incorpo-
ration law solved this problem by allowing the Village to incorporate.'
The second problem involved providing government-funded special edu-
cation to Satmar children.' The Monroe-Woodbury District's provision
of the services at public schools solved this problemum For Justice
O'Connor, these situations represented how neutral laws can accommo-
date religious needs." She emphasized how the zoning and special edu-
cation problems initially were solved using neutral laws that gave similar
rights to everyone and were, in the Satmars' case, used by a religious
group to accommodate its needs. 7 The third accommodation problem
evolved out of the effects of sending the Village children to public
schools; addressing this problem led to Chapter 748 and the Grumet
litigation.'
Justice O'Connor explained that a course of neutrality towards religion
leads to an equal treatment of citizens regardless of their religious prefer-
ences." "The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that
one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another,"
and thus, laws which classify based on religion must be evaluated with
strict scrutiny.' ° Following this command results in an "emphasis on
equal treatment" in Establishment Clause jurisprudence which, for Jus-
tice O'Connor, is "an eminently sound approach" to such cases." Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, an unconstitutional infringement of the
Establishment Clause exists when government makes "adherence to re-
ligion relevant to a person's standing in the political community."' Jus-
240. Id, (O'Connor, J., concurring). No other Justices joined in Justice O'Connor's
opinion.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2495-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
243. Id. at 2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
250. Id. (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)).
251. Id.
252. Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring)).
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tice O'Connor then related this rule back to the notion of accommoda-
tion by asserting that "[a]ccommodations may thus justify treating those
who share this belief differently from those who do not; but they do not
justify discriminations based on sect."25 Accordingly, for Justice
O'Connor, Chapter 748 did not represent a permissible accommodation
of the Satmars' unique needs because it amounted to discriminatory
treatment of the Satmars based on their religion.
Justice O'Connor next emphasized the alternatives available to New
York for accommodating the Satmars and any other similarly situated
communities.' New York could pass a neutral law that allowed all vil-
lages to form their own school districts or it could promulgate neutral
criteria that a village would be required to meet in order to form its own
school district.' Another alternative presented by Justice O'Connor
was for the Court to reconsider Aguilar v. Felton.. and allow
government-funded special education to be provided on nonpublic reli-
gious school grounds. 7 Aguilar's disapproval of such a scheme, for
Justice O'Connor, represented government hostility towards religion
which, as a result, led New York to favor religion by enacting Chapter
748.m
Next, Justice O'Connor turned to the fact that the Court did not base
its holding on the Lemon test.'s She expressed her aversion to the
Court's post-Lemon efforts to awkwardly shoehorn new Establishment
Clause issues into the confines of the Lemon test." Instead of remain-
253. Id. "The Constitution permits 'nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption[s),
not sectarian ones.'" Id. (quoting Employment Div. Dep't of Health Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). To illustrate this point,
Justice O'Connor used the example that while the exemption of sacramental wines
from a prohibition law is a permissible accommodation, exemption of sacramental
wines of Catholics only is not permissible. Id.
254. Id. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
255. Id. The latter alternative could "be applied by a state agency, and the decision
would then be reviewable by the judiciary." Id. For Justice O'Connor, Grumet would
not invalidate a district created under such generally applicable schemes. Id.
256. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
257. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra notes 51-57
and accompanying text.
258. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "The court should, in a
proper case, be prepared to reconsider Aguilar, in order to bring our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence back to what I think is the proper track-government impar-
tiality, not animosity, towards religion." Id. Justice O'Connor dissented in Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 373, 421 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
259. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
260. Id. at 2498-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She admitted that a "Grand Unified
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ing attached to Lemon, Justice O'Connor advocated that the Court
should take "a less unitary" approach to Establishment Clause cases that
would allow the Court to derive multiple "narrow tests" which could be
applied in different Establishment Clause issue categories." Each cate-
gory of Establishment Clause cases, such as "government speech on reli-
gious topics" or "government... decisions about matters of religious
doctrine or law," would be governed by those principles unique to the
interests at stake and be judged under an appropriate, more narrow,
test.' Finally, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the use of a narrower
test would both lead to more consensus among the Justices and avoid
abandonment of the insights gleaned from Lemon's previous applica-
tions.' In Justice O'Connor's opinion, if the Establishment Clause were
freed from Lemon's confines, "[tihe hard questions would, of course, still
have to be asked; but they [would] be asked within a more carefully
tailored and less distorted framework."
E. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy wrote separately to express his support for the
Court's result and to explain the "narrower theory" upon which his deci-
sion rested.' The Court's opinion, according to Justice Kennedy, "can
be interpreted to say that an accommodation for a particular religious
group is invalid because of the risk that the legislature will not grant the
same accommodation to another religious group suffering some similar
burden. " ' For Justice Kennedy, this interpretation lacked support in
the Court's precedents and represented "a needless restriction upon the
legislature's ability to respond to the unique problems of a particular re-
ligious group.""7 Rather, for Justice Kennedy, Chapter 748 was uncon-
Theory" for all Establishment Clause cases is appealing; however, "[any test that
must deal with widely disparate situations risks being so vague as to be useless." Id.
at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Lemon, for Justice O'Connor, has achieved such
vagueness. Id. Justice O'Connor then catalogued the oddities of Lemon jurisprudence
to point out its vagueness and the anomalous results it produced. Id.
261. Id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
262. Id, at 2499-500 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor also identified
"[glovernment delegations of power to religious bodies" as another category and she
observed that "there may well be additional categories, or more opportune places to
draw the lines between the categories." Id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 2500-01 (Kennedy, J., concurring). No other Justices joined in Justice
Kennedy's concurrence.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did not cite the cases to
which he referred. Id.
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stitutional because New York impermissibly drew a political boundary
based on religion.'
The concurrence emphasized that it was not the accommodation of the
Satmar children's special needs that resulted in Chapter 748's
unconstitutionality." Rather, the problem with Chapter 748 was
grounded in the "fundamental limitation" on governmental accommoda-
tion of religion that "government may not use religion as a criterion to
draw political or electoral lines." 'r Justice Kennedy found that since
"the New York legislature knew that everyone within the Village was
Satmar when it drew the school district along the village lines, and it
determined who was to be included in the district by imposing, in effect,
a religious test," Chapter 748 violated the Establishment Clause." Ac-
cording to Justice Kennedy, the New York legislature's actions repre-
sented "explicit religious gerrymandering. " '
268. Id.
269. Id. Justice Kennedy explained that it was not the existence of the Kiryas Joel
District that violated the Constitution, but rather "the forbidden manner in which the
New York Legislature sought to go about" creating it. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy then catalogued the history of accommodation of religious practices
in the United States. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Furthermore, because Chapter 748
was designed to "alleviate a specific burden on the Satmars' religious practice," which
New York was entitled to do, it "did not impose or increase any burden on
non-Satmars, compared to the burden it lifted from the Satmars," did not "favor the
Satmar religion to the exclusion of any other," and because any future failures of
New York to accommodate similar religious needs could be judicially challenged, the
Kiryas Joel District did "not suffer any of the typical infirmities that might invalidate
an attempted legislative accommodation." Id. at 2502-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
270. Id. at 2504 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
271. Id
272. Id, Justice Kennedy distinguished between the creation of the Kiryas Joel Dis-
trict and the incorporation of the Village itself. Id. The key difference was that "the
village was formed pursuant to a religion-neutral self-incorporation scheme," under
which Monroe had no substantive discretion to reject the request for incorporation.
Id. Alternatively, the Kiryas Joel District was created by a discretionary act of the
New York legislature, which thus "had a direct hand in accomplishing the religious
segregation." Id. Justice Kennedy also emphasized that the Establishment Clause does
not prevent boundaries to be drawn based on neutral criteria where the result is a
religiously homogeneous population. Id. at 2504-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). However,
Chapter 748 did not represent boundaries drawn based on neutral criteria, but rather
"forced separation that occurs when the government draws explicit political
boundaries on the basis of people's faith." Id. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Kennedy also observed that "[tihe danger of stigma and stirred animosities is no
less acute for religious line-drawing than for racial." Id. at 2503 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
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Finally, Justice Kennedy observed that Grumet was an unusual case
because the problem that Chapter 748 sought to solve was "attributable,
in no small measure to... unfortunate rulings by this Court."' Justice
Kennedy concluded that the Court's "decisions in [Board of Education of
the City o] Grand Rapids and Aguilar may have been erroneous" be-
cause neutral aid schemes, available to all students regardless of where
they attended school, are preferable ways to deal with problems like
those experienced by the Satmar children than are statutes like Chapter
748." The error of those decisions, however, could not be compounded
with a similar holding in Grumet. 5 "We must confront this case as it
comes before us, without bending'rules to free the Satmars from a pre-
dicament into which we put them." ' Thus, because Chapter 748 drew
political boundaries based on religion, in Justice Kennedy's opinion, it
violated the Establishment Clause."
F. Justice Scalia's Dissent
"The Court today finds that the Powers That Be, up in Albany, have
conspired to effect an establishment of the Satmar Hasidim." ' With
this opening shot, Justice Scalia began his dissent, in which he argued
that the plurality had discarded the text and history of the Establishment
Clause and labeled "religious toleration" an establishment of religion.'
Justice Scalia characterized the Kiryas Joel District as purely public in
nature, with only the fact that all of its students are members of the
same religion distinguishing it from other public school districts.'m As
such, Justice Scalia stated that the Court's precedent did not prohibit
such a district and, in fact, "the Court has specifically approved the edu-
273. Id. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy then recounted the histo-
ry leading up to Chapter 748, emphasizing how the Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985), and School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985),
rulings forced the Monroe-Woodbury District to abandon its program of providing the
special services at the Kiryas Joel religious schools. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 2505-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion.
280. Id. Justice Scalia noted that the school operated by the Kiryas Joel District
provided secular education, was run by a superintendent who was not a Satmar, was
staffed by employees who do not live in the Village, conducted co-ed classes, and
complied with the same rules that governed all New York public schools. Id. Addi-
tionally, Justice Scalia pointed out that no allegations were made "that this public
school has gone too far in making special adjustments to the religious needs of its
students." Id.
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cation of students of a single religion on a neutral site adjacent to a pri-
vate religious school."28 Justice Scalia reasoned that because the Court
previously approved that kind of measure, providing such education at a
public school must also be permissible.'
Next, Justice Scalia took issue with Justice Souter's opinion.' First,
Justice Scalia rejected Justice Souter's conclusion that the delegation of
civil authority to a church, like that involved in the Larkin case, is the
same as choosing a group based on cultural characteristics, like that in-
volved in Grumet.m Justice Scalia contended that if Justice Souter's
equation of civil authority held by a church with civil authority held by
citizens who are members of the same church was accepted, "one must
believe that large portions of the civil authority exercised during most of
[United States] history were unconstitutional."' Justice Scalia charac-
terized Justice Souter's opinion as holding that groups of citizens cannot
be vested with political power if they are members of the same reli-
gion.' Justice Scalia rejected this approach as "antagonistic to the pur-
poses of the Religion Clauses."'
Evaluating Justice Souter's contention that religion motivated the
Kiryas Joel District's creation, Justice Scalia contended that such an
allegation, made by an unelected judge, cannot void democratically en-
acted laws without being accompanied by a showing that no neutral,
secular basis existed for the law.' Justice Scalia had "no possible
281. Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1977)). Also, Justice Scalia
recalled Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993), in which
the Court permitted a public employee to assist a student attending a Catholic
school. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at
2469).
282. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 2506-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 203-32 and accompanying
text.
284. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
285. Id Justice Scalia characterized the history of the settling of North America as
"the story of groups of people sharing a common religious and cultural heritage strik-
ing out to form their own communities." Id.
286. Id. at 2508 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
287. Id. Furthermore, Justice Scalia rejected Justice Souter's attempt to limit his
finding of unconstitutionality of conferring civil authority upon members of the same
religion to the unique facts surrounding Chapter 748's enactment. Id. These facts
"have nothing to do with whether conferral of power upon a group of citizens can
be the conferral of power upon a religious institution. It can not. Or if it can, our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been transformed." Id.
288. I& (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452
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doubt" that Chapter 748 rested upon a secular basis.' This secular
basis was the New York Legislature's desire to provide the Village's dis-
abled students with the services to which they were entitled without
subjecting them to the trauma they encountered at public schools out-
side the Village.'e Justice Scalia observed that the incorporation of the
Village resulted from the Satmars' unique zoning needs and that all per-
sons except Satmars were excluded from the Village, not because of
their religion, but because they did not share the Satmars' desire for
high-density zoning. 1 Because the Village emerged from these "secular
governmental desires," the fact that the Village amounted to a "political
unit whose members shared the same religion" could not legitimately be
used to show that the Kiryas Joel District was created based on reli-
gion.'e However, Justice Scalia asserted that Justice Souter's opinion
utilized this faulty connection.'m
"[E]ven if Chapter 748 were intended to create a special arrangement
for the Satmars because of their religion (not including... any conferral
of governmental power upon a religious entity) it would be a permissible
accommodation."'m Justice Scalia stated that the Establishment Clause
permits accommodation, even if a statute is based on religion, and even
(1971)).
289. Id. at 2509 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
290. Id. Justice Scalia went on to reject what he saw as the three reasons why
Justice Souter found that religious preference prompted the enactment of Chapter
748. Id.; see supra notes 203-32 and accompanying text. FIrst, Justice Scalia stated
that the enactment of Chapter 748 was not done in a special manner, atypical of
New York's usual creation of public school districts. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2509
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Second, since the Kiryas Joel District was not created in an
extraordinary manner, its creation could not have contradicted New York's trend of
consolidating districts. Id. Third, Justice Scalia stated that just because all members
of the Kiryas Joel District were Satmars, there was no basis for Justice Souter's con-
clusion that Chapter 748 was enacted based on the Satmars' religious rather than
cultural distinctiveness. Id. at 2510 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia characterized
this assumption by Justice Souter as "a novel Establishment Clause principle to the
effect that no secular objective may be pursued by a means that might also be used
for religious favoritism if some other means [to meet the students' special needs] is
available." Id. For Justice Scalia, the fact that the Satmars' distinctiveness is based on
their religion subjected them to a disadvantage in Justice Souter's analysis, which
would have allowed a district such as the Kiryas Joel District to be created if the
distinctiveness requiring special treatment was nonreligious. Id. According to Justice
Scalia, such a disadvantage is not sanctioned by the Establishment Clause. Id. (Scala,
J., dissenting) (citing McDanial v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1977) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring)).
291. Id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id,
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when the Free Exercise Clause does not require accommodation.' Jus-
tice Scalia then catalogued the United States' history of accommodating
religion.' According to Justice Scalia, Justice Souter's opinion failed to
acknowledge that the Court has not held that delegation of civil authority
to citizens who share the same religion is unconstitutional.'c Justice
Scalia then rebutted Justice Souter's reason that Chapter 748 represented
an impermissible accommodation-the absence of any guarantee of neu-
trality in conferring such civil authority.' According to Justice Scalia,
"courts cannot escape the obligation" to hear other groups' future pleas
for New York to neutrally allocate power.' Finally, Justice Scalia reit-
erated his opinion that the Establishment Clause prohibits laws that
favor one religion over another." What he objected to about the
Court's decision was, instead, its "novel 'up front' procedural require-
ments on state legislatures" to guarantee similar treatment of all similar
religious or secular groups."l
Justice Scalia characterized Justice Stevens' concurrence as "less a
legal analysis than a manifesto of secularism" because of its concern that
the Kiryas Joel District would help parents cement their children's reli-
gious beliefs.' For Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens' analysis would for-
bid "any state action that incidentally helps parents to raise their chil-
dren in their own religious faith," and, in doing so, "surpasses a mere re-
jection of accommodation, and announces a positive hostility to reli-
295. Id.
296. Id. at 2511-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299. Id. Justice Scalia argued that Justice Souter's assertion that neutrality must be
guaranteed "up front" ran contrary to "both traditional accommodation and the judi-
cial role." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah,
113 S. Ct. 2217, 2241 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring); Oregon Dept. of Human Resources
v. Smith, 949 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)).
300. Id. at 2514 (Scaia, J., dissenting).
301. Id.
302. Id. Justice Scalia referred to Justice Stevens' assertion that the continued isola-
tion of the Satmar students would, while protecting them from the trauma experi-
enced when attending public schools, "unquestionably" increase the odds of those
children remaining faithful to the Satmar faith. Id. (quoting id. at 2495 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)). According to Justice Scalia, this contention is contrary to the Court's
holding in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), in which the Court upheld "a
program permitting public school children to attend the religious-instruction program
of their parents' choice." Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315).
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gion-which, unlike other noncriminal values, the state must not assist
parents in transmitting to their offspring." '
Regarding Justice Kennedy's concurrence, Justice Scalia could not
agree with Justice Kennedy's findings that while the creation of the Vil-
lage was constitutional because it was accomplished under a generally
applicable law, the creation of the Kiryas Joel District was unconstitu-
tional because it was accomplished pursuant to a specific legislative
act.' Justice Scalia found that this distinction did not amount to the
creation of a constitutional defect.'
Justice Scalia joined in the chorus sung by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy's concurrences calling for the reexamination of the Grand Rap-
ids and Aguilar decisions.' Justice Scalia stated that these cases
"should be overruled at the earliest opportunity."'
Finally, Justice Scalia turned to the Court's "snub" of the Lemon
test.' He emphasized that the three lower courts relied on Lemon in
coming to their decisions and that the parties spent over eighty pages
briefing the case under the Lemon framework or calling for its abandon-
ment." "It seems quite inefficient for this Court, which in reaching its
decisions relies heavily on the briefing of the parties and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the opinions of the lower courts, to mislead lower courts and par-
ties about the relevance of the Lemon test.""' Justice Scalia stated that,
in Lemon's place, "[tihe foremost principle [he] would apply is fidelity to
the longstanding traditions of our people."3 11
V. IMPACT
A. Judicial Impact
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet's
impact on Establishment Clause jurisprudence is twofold. First, the
Justices' opinions modified previous Establishment Clause tests and
created a new test. This represents a significant shift in the various
modes of analysis the Justices bring to Establishment Clause cases. The
303. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
304. Id
305. Id.
306. Id. at 2514-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Agullar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)).
307. Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308. Id.
309. Id
310. Id,
311. Id. Justice Scalia rejected Justice O'Connor's call for the announcement of sev-
eral new tests and asserted that his historical approach would "surely provide the di-
versity of treatment that Justice O'Connor seeks." Id.
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Establishment Clause Approaches sub-section examines the different
tests used by the Justices in Grumet and explores how the tests were
modified from previous formulations or created anew."2 In addition,
that sub-section speculates as to how the tests will be applied in future
cases."3' Second, because it brought about these changes in the Court's
analysis, Grumet will change the future course of the lines of cases
which were explored in the Historical Background section. The Impact
on Establishment Clause Caselaw sub-section will analyze how these
lines of precedent will evolve in the future as a result of Grumet.'
1. Establishment Clause Approaches
The Court's refusal in Grumet to expressly apply or abandon the Lem-
on test as the principal Establishment Clause test, coupled with the
Court's inability to present a new Establishment Clause approach upon
which a majority of Justices could agree leaves the Court with an in-
creasingly long list of Establishment Clause approaches, none of which
seem to be satisfactory for a majority of Justices in a majority of Estab-
lishment Clause cases."' The Grumet opinions dramatically altered this
list of approaches, and this sub-section will analyze the tests created,
changed, and abandoned by the Court in Grumet.
a. The Endorsement Test
In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 6 Justice O'Connor
presented her endorsement test, which she labeled a clarification of the
Lemon test.1 The principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause,
312. See infra notes 315-99 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 310-415 and accompanying text.
314. See infra notes 416-46 and accompanying text.
315. For example, in Marsh v. Chambers, the Court applied the history test and
concluded that a state legislature's opening of each session with a prayer given by a
publicly-paid chaplain was sufficiently grounded in historical practice to pass constitu-
tional muster. 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983). Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined in the
Court's Marsh opinion; however, only Chief Justice Rehnquist continues to follow a
primarily history-based approach. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct at 2495-2500 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (advocating multiple Establishment Clause tests); id. at 2505-16
(Rehnquist, C.J., joining Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion) (advocating a historical
approach).
316. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
317. Id at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor felt that her analysis
"clarifle[d] the Lemon test as an analytical device." Id.; see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
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she stated, was to prohibit the government from "making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political com-
munity.""8 This principle is violated when government becomes exces-
sively entangled with religious institutions or when government endorses
or disapproves of religion."' "Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."' With this prin-
ciple in mind, Justice O'Connor explained that her endorsement test
would modify the first and second Lemon prongs" to ask, respectively,
"whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion" and "whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the
practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval."'
Later, in WaUlace v. Jaffree, Justice O'Connor explained how the
mechanics of the endorsement test could be modified in cases where the
Court sought to accommodate citizens' free exercise of religion consis-
tently with the Establishment Clause. ' In a case where a government
U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to the endorsement test as a
"refinement of the Lemon test"); Conkle, supra note 31, at 879 (referring to the en-
dorsement test as a "modification" of the Lemon test). For commentary on the en-
dorsement test see Donald L. Beshle, The Conservative as Libera The Religion
Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME
L REV. 151 (1987) (arguing for adherence to the principle of liberal neutrality in Es-
tablishment Clause decision making and suggesting that such a principle is better
served by an approach similar to Justice O'Connor's rather than the Court's tradition-
al focus on the preservation of separation of church and state); Arnold H. Loewy,
Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment
Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L REV. 1049
(1986) (praising Justice O'Connor's move towards the prohibition of governmental
endorsement or disapproval of religion as the correct Establishment Clause test, and
suggesting that serious adherence to this principle is proper, but would require a
dramatic shift in the Court's jurisprudence that it is probably not prepared to under-
take); W. Scott Simpson, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifca-
tions of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L REV. 465
(1986) (explaining how Justice O'Connor's endorsement test changed and improved
the first two prongs of the Lemon test).
318. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
319. Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
320. Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
321. See supra note 34 and accompanying text
322. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
323. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
324. Id. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "[T]his 'accommodation' analysis would
help reconcile our Free Exercise and Establishment Clause standards . . . ." Id. Jus-
tice O'Connor offered this modification of her endorsement test as an alternative to
the "neutrality" approach to reconciling the two religion clauses that the Court histor-
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act "lifts a government-imposed burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion... the Court should simply acknowledge that the religious purpose
of such a statute is legitimated by the Free Exercise Clause. " ' Hence,
the first endorsement clause inquiry-whether the government intended
to endorse religion-is not fatal to government laws motivated by reli-
gious concerns, as long as those concerns spring from the government's
desire to accommodate the free exercise of religion.' The second part
of the endorsement test analysis--whether the government activity en-
dorsed or disapproved of religion-is modified to weigh the value of the
free exercise claim against the offensiveness of the endorsement per-
ceived by an objective observer.' 7 This objective observer is charged
with knowledge of "the Free Exercise Clause and the values it pro-
motes."' The modified second endorsement test inquiry, then, ac-
counts for the conflict between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses in cases which implicate both clauses. Thus, Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test changed Lemon's perspective' and provided a frame-
work within which Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns
could be reconciled.
Despite her discussion of Grumet as a case which arose from the
Village's struggle for accommodation of its religious beliefs,'m Justice
O'Connor did not apply the modified-for-accommodation version of her
endorsement test to the case.l Instead, Justice O'Connor backed down
from her previous search for a single principle against which to judge
Ically used. Id. at 82-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra notes 109-11 and
accompanying text (noting the nature of the conflict between the two religion claus-
es).
325. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
326. "It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular purpose when the manifest
objective of a statute is to facilitate the free exercise of religion by lifting a
government-imposed burden." Id.
327. Id. "Thus individual perceptions, or resentment that a religious observer is ex-
empted from a particular government requirement, would be entitled to little weight if
the Free Exercise Clause strongly supported the exemption." Id.
328. Id.
329. See Lewis & Vild, supra note 142, at 673-88 (charting the evolution and
adoption by the Court of the endorsement test as a modification of Lemon);
Underwood, supra note 25, at 56 (noting that, after Lynch, the Court consistently
applied the endorsement test in cases dealing with kindergarten through twelfth grade
education issues).
330. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,
2495-96 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
331. Id.
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Establishment Clause cases,' like her endorsement test, and suggested
that each kind of Establishment Clause case may call for the application
of unique principles and tests.' Justice O'Connor's failure to apply the
endorsement test, coupled with her call for the development of several
specialized tests, is a notable development in her Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and may reflect two realities.
The first reality is that the Court, as evidenced by its previous failures,
simply may never be able to consistently agree on a single Establishment
Clause test. ' By calling on the Court to develop a "less unitary ap-
proach" in light of the tendency of generalized tests, such as Lemon, to
produce worse rather than better decisions, Justice O'Connor suggest-
ed that the search for a single Establishment Clause test may, ironically,
be responsible for the Court's inability to devise a single approach to Es-
tablishment Clause cases." Thus, her opinion represents an acknowl-
edgment that a single test, whether Lemon, endorsement, or any other
test, may not be workable in the near future and, hence, the Court ought
to search elsewhere for an effective approach to the Establishment
Clause.
The second reality stems from the fact that Justice O'Connor did not
apply her endorsement test in Grumet.3 7 Instead, she focused on
whether the government distributed benefits based on religion to the
potential exclusion of other groups.' Thus, Justice O'Connor implicitly
acknowledged that her endorsement test, like Lemon or any other test, is
not appropriate for all Establishment Clause cases. She instead called for
332. "[O]ur goal should be 'to frame a principle for constitutional adjudication that
is not only grounded in the history and language of the first amendment, but one
that is also capable of consistent application to the relevant problems.'" Wallace, 472
U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Jesse H. Choper, Religion in the Public
Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L REv. 329, 332-33 (1963)).
333. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2498-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Petitioner Board
of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District's Brief at 46, Board of
Educ. of Kiyas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.Ct. 2481 (1994) (Nos. 93-517,
93-527 & 93-539) (suggesting that the Court should "revisit the issue whether any one
specific test can fairly assess the constitutionality of such as broad range of activities
or whether a series of more program or activity-specific tests should be formulated").
334. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that with the
use of multiple Establishment Clause cases, "[t]here might also be, I hope, more con-
sensus on each of the narrow tests than there has been on a broad test").
335. Id. at 2498-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "[T]he bad test may drive out the
good. Rather than taldng the opportunity to derive narrower, more precise tests ...
courts tend to continually try to patch up the broad test, making it more and more
amorphous and distorted. This, I am afraid, has happened with Lemon." Id. at 2499
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
336. Id. at 2498-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
337. Id. at 2495-2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
338. Id. at 2497-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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a new approach to this area of law-the "less unitary approach"-in an
effort to try to move the Court away from its futile search for the "Grand
Unified Theory" of the Establishment Clause.' In doing so, Justice
O'Connor broadened the focus of her own Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, probably in an attempt to persuade the Court to shift its focus
away from Lemon or any other single test, and towards a more workable
and scrutable Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
b. The Fusion Test
In Grumet, Justice Souter's analysis applied what this article refers to
as the "fusion test" to Chapter 748.' Justice Souter did not adhere to
any previously-derived Establishment Clause test to decide Grumet and,
instead, based his findings largely on the similarities between Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc."' and Grumet."2 Justice Souter noted that the
Larkin Court found that the law at issue ran afoul of the Establishment
Clause because it did not preserve for the state a neutral relationship
with religion.' It was the fusion of state and religious functions caused
by the law at issue in Larkin that violated the neutrality principle.'
The fusion test evolved from this analysis.
Justice Souter's invocation of the Court's threshold requirement that
government remain neutral towards religion was not at all extraordi-
nary.' The Court, in fact, has used neutrality as a basic principle over
339. Id at 2498-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
340. Justice Souter did not label his analysis as the fusion test. Rather, this Note
refers to the standard for judgment provided in the section of Justice Souter's opin-
ion in which he discussed the notion of impermissible fusion as the fusion test.
341. 459 U.S. 116 (1982); see supra notes 123-31 accompanying text.
342. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2487-90. In his tenure on the Court, Justice Souter has
written only one other Establishment Clause opinion, a concurring opinion in Lee v.
Weisman. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2667 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). In that opinion, Justice
Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor, argued that the history of the Es-
tablishment Clause mandates not only governmental neutrality between religions, but
also neutrality between religion and nonreligion. Id. at 2668 (Souter, J., concurring).
343. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2488.
344. Id. at 2487-88.
345. Id.; see Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2466-67 (1993)
(applying the principle that neutrally provided government benefits to religious school
students are not prohibited by the Establishment Clause); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 608 (1988) (finding flawed, while conducting a Lemon test analysis, a stat-
ute that did not confer authority in a religiously-neutral manner); Larkin v. Grendel's
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982) (finding, within the Court's analysis of Lemon's
second prong, that any governmental authority conferred on a religious group would
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which a number of tests have been applied in Establishment Clause cas-
es.' Furthermore, Justice Souter stated that Larkin stood for the prin-
ciple that a "fusion" of state and religious powers is prohibited by the
Establishment Clause because that fusion leads to the excessive entan-
glement of government and religion. 7 While this concern over exces-
sive entanglement is essentially the third Lemon prong, 8 Justice
Souter's analysis of Grumet only offered entanglement as a justification
for the Establishment Clause's prohibition of fusion of state and religious
functions. 9 Thus, Justice Souter's opinion, while discussing neutrality
and Lemon's third prong, is not unique because of its contribution to
those doctrines.'m Instead, Justice Souter tied his analysis securely to
the fusion notion and, therefore, his opinion represents the first formu-
lation of the fusion test.
The fusion test embodies the union of two strands of Establishment
Clause logic from the Court's previous cases, combined with the notion
that government may not delegate its power to religious groups on the
basis of religion. In School District of Abington v. Schempp, ' Justice
Clark, writing for the majority, explained that the Court's traditional
concern for governmental neutrality towards religion "stems from a rec-
ognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might
bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions... to the
end that official support of the State... would be placed behind the
have to be neutrally employed); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty V.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973) (recognizing the importance of neutrality in Es-
tablishment Clause analysis in the course of the Court's application of the Lemon
test); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-77 (1970) (applying the principle of
"benevolent neutrality"); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
222 (1963) (cataloging the "wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak"
and using that analysis to reach a decision); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
18 (1947) (applying the principle that the Establishment Clause requires governmental
neutrality, not hostility, towards religion).
346. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2487-88.
347. Id. at 2488 (quoting Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126).
348. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
349. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2488.
350. Justice Souter also relied on the absence of any guarantee that New York
would afford similar treatment to other groups like that afforded the Satmars by
Chapter 748. Id. at 2488. This concern also stemmed from his broader concern for
neutrality. Id. at 2489. However, this reason is given as an additional or supportive
factor which contributed to the finding of Chapter 748's unconstitutionality, with the
fusion problem remaining foremost in Justice Souter's analysis. Id. Chapter 748 violat-
ed the Establishment Clause "by delegating the State's discretionary authority over
public schools to a group defined by its character as a religious community, in a
legal and historical context that gives no assurance that governmental power has
been or will be exercised neutrally." Id. at 2487.
351. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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tenets of one or of all orthodoxies. " ' Later, in Larkin, concluding its
analysis of the case based on the Lemon test, the Court stated that Es-
tablishment Clause precedent connotes that "the core rationale underly-
ing the Establishment Clause is preventing 'a fusion of governmental and
religious functions.'"' To fortify the fusion test's legitimacy, Justice
Souter added to this fusion rhetoric by noting the existence of Estab-
lishment Clause precedent that teaches that government cannot delegate
its power to or participate in the affairs of a religious group.m
So how does the fusion test work? In his analysis of why Chapter 748
represented an impermissible fusion of governmental and religious au-
thority, Justice Souter framed his fusion analysis as an assessment of
whether civic authority is given by a government to a group selected on
the basis of a religious criterion.' Hence, Justice Souter's analysis sug-
gested that if government action conferred civic authority based on the
religion of the recipients of that authority, the fusion of civic and reli-
gious authority or functions would result and the fusion test would be
violated. When the fusion test is violated, so too is the Establishment
Clause.
The fusion test distinguishes between selection of a group to hold civic
authority based on religious criteria and selection based on neutral fac-
tors despite the fact that the group is comprised of members of the same
352. Id. at 222. The Court went on to invalidate state laws which required the pub-
lic school day to begin with readings from the Bible. Id. at 223. The Court found the
requirement that students engage in a religious exercise to violate the Establishment
Clause's command of government neutrality towards religion. Id.
353. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982) (quoting Schempp,
374 U.S. at 222). This statement stood as the beginning of the Court's summary of
why the statute at issue violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at 126-27. The bulk of
the Court's analysis, however, was framed in Lemon terms. Id. at 122-27. Additionally,
in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Blaclunun explained that "religious freedom cannot exist
in the absence of a free democratic government, and that such a government cannot
endure when there is fusion between religion and the political regime." 112 S. Ct.
2649, 2667 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Souter, in Grumet, however, did
not cite this fusion rhetoric. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2488-90.
354. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2488 (citing Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
590-91 (1989); Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493-94
(1961); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)).
355. Id. at 2489-90. "Where 'fusion' is an issue, the difference lies in the distinction
between a government's purposeful delegation on the basis of religion and a delega-
tion on principles neutral to religion, to individuals whose religious identities are
incidental to their receipt of civic authority." Id. at 2489.
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religion.' Thus, in Grumet, Justice Souter found the New York
legislature's enactment of Chapter 748 "to be substantially equivalent to
defining a political subdivision and hence the qualification for its
franchise by a religious test, resulting in a purposeful and forbidden
'fusion of governmental and religious functions. '"" To determine
whether Chapter 748 delegated civic authority based on religion or on
neutral grounds, Justice Souter looked to the context of the statute's
enactment.a' Justice Souter's analysis suggested that an analysis of the
circumstances motivating the government action would be used to deter-
mine, under the fusion test, when a policy was "substantially equivalent"
to allocating civic power to a religious group, absent express language in
the law referring to religion or religious groups as the basis for the con-
ferral of power."
Justice Souter's fusion test emerged from a handful of precedents
which did not rely on fusion as a rule against which to measure the Es-
tablishment Clause issues."° Hence, the fusion test is significant be-
cause it placed these previously-conceived ideas regarding the fusion of
governmental and religious authority at the forefront of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. In Grumet, the fusion test was the main support
upon which the Court's decision rested and commanded the support of
four Justices." As no single test currently enjoys the consistent sup-
port of a majority of Justices,' the fusion test will likely only be used
in cases factually similar to Larkin and Grumet. Therefore, the fusion
test is not singularly definitive of the Court's current Establishment
Clause approach. The fusion test does, however, now exist as a distinct
approach the Court may continue to utilize when deciding Establishment
Clause cases. In cases where government attempts to alleviate a burden
356. Id. at 2488-89.
357. Id. at 2490 (quoting Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126).
358. Id. at 2489-90.
359. Id; see supra note 216 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 351-54 and accompanying text.
361. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2484. Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Ginsburg joined in
Justice Souter's promulgation of the fusion test. Id. However, Justice Blackmun's re-
tirement from the Court after the term in which Grumet was decided reduced the
fusion test's support by one Justice. See Patricia A. Brennan & Daniel B. Kohrman,
The 1993-94 Term of the United States Supreme Court and its Impact on Public
Schools, 93 EDUC. L REP. 1, 2 (West 1994) (noting Justice Blackmun's departure from
the court).
362. For example, in Grumet, a majority of Justices could not agree on the ap-
proach to be applied in deciding the case, but six Justices did agree that Chapter
748 violated the Establishment Clause. 114 S. Ct. 2481. In Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District, decided in the term before the Grumet deci-
sion, the vote was unanimous, but three opinions with differing analysis were written.
113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
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on a religious group by allowing it to more directly control its civic desti-
ny, or where government blatantly places religious groups in positions of
civic authority, Justice Souter's fusion test may guide the Court's deci-
sions.
c. The History Test
In Marsh v. Chambers,' Chief Justice Burger applied what can be
labeled the history test' to a challenge of the Nebraska legislature's
practice of opening each legislative session with a prayer lead by a
publicly-funded chaplain.' Chief Justice Burger's history test looked to
the history of a particular practice to assess whether its religious compo-
nents had traditionally been permitted, or even sanctioned, by law.'
The test then used that history as a guide to assess whether the Framers
intended to allow such practices. 7 Justice Burger explained that
"[s]tanding alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary viola-
tions of constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than simply
historical patterns."' The "far more" was the Framers' intent as to the
meaning and application of the Establishment Clause, which supported
the practice at issue in Marsh.' Hence, because "the opening of ses-
sions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is
deeply embedded in the history and tradition" of the United States, the
Nebraska practice passed constitutional muster under the history test.m
In his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Joffree,nl Justice Rehnquist
gave a detailed account of the history of the birth of the Establishment
363. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
364. This approach has been called many things, such as "fidelity to the longstand-
ing traditions of our people," Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting), or an
"original intent" approach, Russell M. Mortyn, Note, The Rehnquist Court and the
New Establishment Clause, 19 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 567, 577 (1992). See Ivan E.
Bodensteiner, The 'Lemon Test" Even With All Its Shortcomings, is Not the Real
Problem in Establishment Clause Cases, 24 VAL U. L REv. 409, 411-12 (1990) (ana-
lyzing Marsh).
365. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784.
366. Id. at 786-95.
367. Id. at 786-91.
368. Id. at 790.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 786, 791. Justice Stevens is the only current member of the Court who
dissented in Marsh. Id. at 822 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor were in the majority in Marsh. Id. at 784.
371. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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Clause and its meaning in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries.'
This use of history to conclude that the "well-accepted meaning" of the
Establishment Clause is that "it forbade establishment of a national reli-
gion, and forbade preference among religious sects or denominations,"
stands as a significant contribution to the history test.m
These and other opinions provided the foundation for the history test
as it exists after Grumet.' Justice Scalia's formulation of the history
test in Grumet analogously, yet simply, required "fidelity to the long-
standing traditions of our people" to be applied as the "foremost princi-
ple" in deciding Establishment Clause cases. 5 In Grumet, Justice Scalia
criticized the Court for having "abandoned text and history as guides" in
making its decision.' 7 Justice Scalia's dissent relied on the teachings of
history and social tradition to draw its conclusions.' This suggests that
372. Id at 91-106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
373. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This decision, coupled with his pro-history deci-
sions since Wallace, including Grumet, places Chief Justice Rehnquist among the sup-
porters of the history test. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (joining Scala, J., dissent-
ing); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (joining Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); see also Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Lemon Test, 72
EDUC. L REP. 1, 10-11 (West 1992) (analyzing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
history-oriented Establishment Clause approach); Mortyn, supra note 364, 574-77 (ex-
plaining Chief Justice Rehnquist's use of original intent in his Establishment Clause
decision making).
374. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., and Kennedy, J.) (dissenting because there was "no basis in the text of the Con-
stitution, the decisions of this Court, or the traditions of our people" for the Court's
decision); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part and and dissenting in part, joined by White, J., and Scalia, J.) (using
"proper sensitivity to our traditions and our case law" as a check on the Leman test
in order to make it an acceptable mode of analysis for Establishment Clause cases).
375. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Franklin, supra note 373,
at 13 (explaining Justice Scalia's Establishment Clause positions and his emphasis on
history and tradition as guidelines); Joseph R. McKinney, Special Education and the
Establishment Clause in the Wake of Zobrest: Back to the Future, 85 EDUc. L REP.
587, 595 (West 1993) (noting that "Justice Scalia is in Chief Justice Rehnquist's camp
regarding the use of an original intent-historical approach").
376. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Generally, in his decisions
regarding constitutional issues, Justice Scala "places heavy reliance on the intent of
the framers and the legislative history behind the enactment of that part of the Con-
stitution" and "believes that long-standing views in society should be given deference."
Schlosser, supra note 111, at 387-88 (footnote omitted); see also Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 670 (Scalia, J., joining Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that Establishment Clause
cases must be assessed against "historical practices and understandings").
377. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2505-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chastising the Court's de-
cision in Grumet, Justice Scalia warned that "[o]nce this Court has abandoned text
and history as guides, nothing prevents it from calling religious toleration the estab-
lishment of religion." Id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that to
accept Justice Souter's characterization of Chapter 748 as "civil authority held by a
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Justice Scalia's current formulation of the history test, which is support-
ed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, 8 would take into
account modem popular practice, in addition to the text and history of
the Establishment Clause and religious practice in the United States,
when analyzing cases.m
While Marsh is the only case in which the history test commanded the
support of a majority of Justices,'e in Grumet, the Chief Justice and
two other Justices affirmed their adherence to the current version of the
history test."l Despite the fact that a majority of Justices do not adhere
to the test on all Establishment Clause occasions,'e the Marsh case
church" and not "civil authority held by members of a church ... one must believe
that large portions of our history were unconstitutional, and that much more of it
than merely the Kiryas Joel School District is unconstitutional today." Id. at 2507
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Scalia asserted that "[wihen a legislature
acts to accommodate religion, particularly a minority sect, 'it follows the best of our
traditions.'" Id. at 2511-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 314 (1952)).
378. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's Grumet
dissent. Id. at 2500 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Scalia's
historical approach in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,
113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring), and Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct.
2649, 2678 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
379. See Schiosser, supra note 111, at 387-88. Justice Scalia relies on history to
frame his analysis in other areas of constitutional adjudication as well. See, e.g.,
Gregory C. Cook, Note, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's Attempt to Impose a Rule of
Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 853, 859 (1991) (analyz-
ing Justice Scalia's "rule of law for determining which historical practices and beliefs
the Court should consider in due process analysis," which consists of an examination
of "the most specific level at which a relevant tradition can be identified protecting
or denying protection to the asserted right").
380. "The Supreme Court has not applied the historical test in any Establishment
Clause decision except Marsh." Allan Gordus, Note, The Establishment Clause and
Prayers in Public High School Graduations: 'Jones v. Clear Creek Independent
School District, 47 Ams L REV. 653, 657 (1994).
381. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
382. For example, Justice O'Connor joined in the Court's Marsh opinion, 463 U.S.
783 (1983), yet she usually applies her endorsement test which is an offshoot of the
Lemon test. See supra notes 316-29 and accompanying text.
Also, by way of example, Justice Kennedy applied his coercion test in Lee v.
Weisman. 112 S. Ct 2649, 2655-61 (1992). The coercion test prohibits government
from coercing citizens to participate in formal religious exercises. See Gordus, supra
note 380, at 681-83 (explaining the coercion test). Justice Kennedy's coercion test,
after Weisman, generated speculation as to whether the coercion test would govern
future Establishment Clause cases. See generally Caress, supra note 147; Cohen, su-
pra note 147; Kahn, supra note 150; Smith, supra note 150. However, neither Justice
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demonstrated that when a religious practice is clearly and deeply embed-
ded in this nation's history, the Justices are likely to cast aside their
usual analysis and sign on to the history test.' Thus, following
Grumet, the history test remains a viable Establishment Clause frame-
work for at least three Justices, and perhaps occasionally more.
d. The Lemon Test
The Lemon test is a sore subject in Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence if for no other reason than because of the repeated blows it suf-
fers at the hands of the Court, and Court watchers, every time the Court
grants certiorari to an Establishment Clause case.'m The battle, howev-
er, may be over and Lemon will, most likely, abdicate its position at the
center of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence with a whimper
rather than a bang. In recent cases, the Court has slowly divorced itself
from Lemon,' returning only occasionally and for no apparent rea-
Kennedy nor any other Justices applied, or even mentioned, coercion in Grumet. See
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481. The coercion test accompanies Justice Kennedy's opinions
and votes which indicate his strong tendency towards using history as a guide in
Establishment Clause cases. "Whatever test we choose to apply must permit not only
legitimate practices two centuries old but also any other practices with no greater
potential for an establishment of religion." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This state-
ment, made just after Justice Kennedy commented that Marsh, 463 U.S. 783, should
be broadly interpreted, indicated that Justice Kennedy agrees with the historical ap-
proach applied in Marsh. See Mykkeltvedt, supra note 31, at 895 (discussing the
Lemon test as it was applied in Marsh); see also Franklin, supra note 373, at 14
(explaining Justice Kennedy's "acceptance of the Marsh historical analysis, and a
philosophy which accommodates religion by permitting non-coercive establishments,"
and concluding that "Justice Kennedy can be expected to support an historical revi-
sion of Lemon"). In his dissent in Weisman, Justice Scalia sharply criticized Justice
Kennedy's use of the coercion test and called him "a defector from [Justice Scalia's]
own previously proclaimed views on establishment doctrine." Mykkeltvedt, supra note
31, at 903. Thus, his Grumet and Weisman opinions indicate that Justice Kennedy
may be pulling away from his alliance with Justice Scalia and the history test.
383. See generally Bodensteiner, supra note 364, at 411-12 (noting that, regarding
the Marsh decision, "[mlaybe the majority was 'result oriented' and the historical test
allowed it to reach the 'right' result").
384. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. CL
2141, 2149-50 (Scalia, J., concurring) (comparing Lemon to "some ghoul in a late-night
horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being re-
peatedly killed and buried" and cataloguing Justices Kennedy, Thomas, O'Connor, and
White's rejections of Lemon); Wirt P. Marks IV, Note, The Lemon Test Rears its Ugly
Head Again: Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 27 U.
RICH. L REv. 1153 (1993); Jill M. Misage, Note, Refusing to Abandon a Real Lemon
of a Test: North Carolina Civil Liberties Union v. Constangy, 28 WAKE FOREST L REV.
775 (1993). See generally Shimonek, supra note 31.
385. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (modifying Lemon to include
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son.m A test so frequently abused by a growing number of Justices
does not possess the strength to remain at the center of the whirlwind
that is Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 7
The Court may have snubbed Lemon in Grumet because Lemon has
occasionally been deemed a test only for use in aid to private religious
schools cases,' and, arguably, Grumet did not deal with aid to reli-
gious schools but instead with a state's delegation of power based on
religious criteria. However, the Court's failure to make such an acknowl-
edgment suggests that, rather than being avoided for that reason, Lemon
was placed out of Grumet's reach simply because the Justices do not
know what, if anything, they want to do with the Lemon test. Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens avoided Lemon altogether.' Justice
O'Connor admitted that the Court did not apply Lemon and, without
saying whether or where Lemon would fit into her new scheme, which
would allegedly rid the Establishment Clause of the problems brought
upon by the Court's not-so-persistent adherence to the Lemon test, ar-
gued for the reconsideration of a case *decided under Lemon.'m Justice
Kennedy did not use Lemon in his analysis and called for the reconsider-
ation of two cases decided under Lemon." ' Additionally, the Onumet
endorsement analysis); Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (applying the history test rather than
Lemon); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982) (limiting Lemon's application).
386. For example, in 1993, the Court used the Lemon test to quickly dismiss the
Establishment Clause issue involved in Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148, but did not
apply it to asses the Establishment Clause issues raised in Zobrest v. Catalina Foot-
hills School District, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
387. For example, in Grumet, Justice O'Connor admitted that the Lemon test has
outlived its usefulness, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
called for its expulsion from the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 114 S.
Ct. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas "have written or
joined opinions criticizing the test and arguing for a different analysis." Baker, supra
note 1, at 250.
388. See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985) (noting that
the Court has "particularly relied on Lemon in every case involving the sensitive rela-
tionship between government and religion in the education of our children"); see also
Underwood, supra note 25, at 56 (noting that the Court "has not strictly adhered to
the Lemon analysis outside the context of education" and that the Court most visibly
departs from Lemon in noneducation cases).
389. See supra note 208, 235-39 and accompanying text.
390. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2498-2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting reconsid-
eration of Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)); see supra note 256 and accompany-
ing text
391. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2500-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted
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dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, reit-
erated their dissatisfaction with the test and cases decided pursuant to it
and stated that they would replace it as soon as possible with the history
test'. Thus, three Justices have all but forgotten Lemon, at least with
regard to the issues raised in Grumet, and five Justices reject Lemon
outright. As a final blow to the embattled test, Justice Blackmun, the
lone voice in support of Lemon, retired from the Court after the term in
which Grumet was decided.33
The Court will likely never again look to Lemon as the Establishment
Clause test. If there is any usefulness left in this sour fruit, it will be that
given to it when Justice O'Connor's multiple-test Establishment Clause
recipe calls for just a small dose of Lemon- la endorsement test of
course-in cases dealing with public funding of private religious
schools' or when Justice Souter's fusion test uses entanglement as a
justification for prohibiting the fusion of governmental and religious
authority.-
In summary, after Grumet, the Justices' Establishment Clause ap-
proaches to cases involving government conferral of power on religious
groups appear to be as follows: Justices Souter, Stevens, and
Ginsburg' will invalidate any fusion of civic and religious authority;
Justice O'Connor will search for narrow tests, one for each distinct kind
of Establishment Clause issue, and invalidate laws which confer civic au-
thority based on religion; 7 Justice Kennedy will invalidate religious ger-
rymandering;' and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas will continue to faithfully adhere to the history test.'
Lemon's flaws and advocated an alternative approach. Id.; see supra notes 265-77 and
accompanying text.
392. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 308-11
and accompanying text.
393. See Brennan & Kohrman, supra note 361, at 1 (noting Justice Blackmun's re-
tirement). Justice Stephen Breyer has replaced Justice Blackmun. Id.; see also Joan
Biskupic, Breyer Belatedly Gets His White House Ceremony, WASH. POsT, Aug. 13,
1994, at A9.
394. Lemon has yet to be completely forgotten in cases involving public funding of
private education. See Underwood, supra note 25, at 95.
395. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2488.
396. "At her confirmation hearing [Justice Ginsburg] tentatively endorsed the Lemon
test, at least in the abstract, because she said she was not aware of any better alter-
native." Baker, supra note 1, at 250.
397. See supra notes 240-64 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 265-77 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 374-81 and accompanying text.
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e. How Will Courts Approach Future Establishment Clause Cases?
Grumet's six to three vote and six separate opinions represent "a con-
fusing cacophony of judicial interpretation concerning the Establishment
Clause."4" After Grumet, endorsement, fusion, coercion,4"1 history,
Lemon, and Justice O'Connor's multi-test approach all exist as alternative
modes of Establishment Clause analysis. This leaves the lower courts
with an almost endless array of tests and principles to apply to Establish-
ment Clause cases; the correct approach or approaches will undoubtedly
remain elusive until the Court provides further guidance.'m
The rationale used by the Court to find Chapter 748 unconstitutional
contradicted the legal community's predictions regarding what and how.
the Court would decide in Grumet. Most significantly, as explained
above in the Factual Background section, all of the lower courts relied
exclusively on the Lemon test to reach their decisions.' Justice Scalia,
in Grumet, pointed out that the Court's failure to rely on Lemon effec-
tively disregarded over eighty pages of the parties' briefs which focused
on the Lemon test.'m The amicus briefs filed on behalf of both sides in
Grumet dealt with Lemon at length, either describing how it validated or
invalidated Chapter 748 or why it should be kept or abandoned as the
dominant Establishment Clause test.' Commentators also noted that
400. David Schimmel, Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet: The Establish-
ment Clause Controversy Continues, 94 EDUC. L. REP. 685, 687 (West 1994).
401. A full evaluation of the coercion test is beyond the scope of this Note. Howev-
er, for an introduction to the test and when the Court used it, see supra note 382.
For an argument that the coercion test has replaced the Lemon test as the new
Establishment Clause test, see Paulsen, supra note 31, at 819-43.
402. See Schimmel, supra note 400, at 688.
403. See supra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
404. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
405. For amicus brief urging affirmance, see Brief for the American Jewish Con-
gress, National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, People for the Ameri-
can Way, General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, & the Union of American
Hebrew Congregations (urging the Court to apply Larkin v. Grenders Den as the
instructive precedent and urging that Lemon be applied and found to be violated by
Chapter 748); Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Ameri-
can Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, American Civil Liberties Union, Na-
tional Council of Jewish Women, & The Unitarian Universalist Association (arguing
that Chapter 748 constituted an unconstitutional delegation of government power to a
religious group); Brief for the Committee for the Well-Being of Kiryas Joel (arguing
that Chapter 748 fails the Lemon test); Brief for the Council on Religious Freedom
(arguing that Chapter 748 fails the Lemon test, which should be retained by the
Court, and constituted religious gerrymandering and should be invalidated under strict
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Grumet represented another opportunity for the Court to explicitly reject
Lemon and, or in the alternative, clarify its Establishment Clause juris-
prudence; however, others insisted that the Court would continue along
its current, undefined path." These factors suggest that the Court's Es-
scrutiny); Brief of the General Council on Finance and Administration of the United
Methodist Church (arguing that Chapter 748 fails the Lemon test, which should be
retained by the Court); Brief for the National Coalition for Public Education and
Religious Liberty & the National Education Association (arguing that Chapter 748
delegated governmental power to a religious group in contravention of the Estab-
lishment Clause based on Larkin); Brief for the National Council of Churches of
Christ in the U.S.A. & James E. Andrews as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (urging the Court to clarify the second prong of
Lemon and the endorsement test); Brief for the National School Boards Association
(arguing that Chapter 748 violates Lemon and the Court's other Establishment Clause
tests); Brief for the New York Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
(arguing that the Court should apply Lemon to find Chapter 748 unconstitutional);
Brief for the New York State United Teachers, AFT, AFL-CIO & the American Federa-
tion of Teachers, AFL-CIO (arguing that Chapter 748 violates the Lemon test and
should be subject to strict scrutiny under Larson v. Valente).
For amicus briefs urging reversal see Brief for the Agudath Israel of America
(urging reconciliation of the two religion clauses that gives wide latitude to religious
groups' free exercise interests and urging the reconsideration of Aguilar and Grand
Rapids); Brief for the Institute for Religion and Polity (arguing that the Court's analy-
sis based on neutrality, embodied in Lemon, is flawed and suggesting that the coer-
cion test is a better approach); Brief for The National Jewish Commission on Law
and Public Affairs (urging that Lemon be overruled to allow for the accommodation
of the secular needs of religious communities, and arguing that Chapter 748 survives
scrutiny under Lemon); Brief for The Rutherford Institute (urging the Court not to
use the Lemon test, but rather to apply neutrality and equal protection principles);
Brief for the Southern Baptist Convention Christian Life Convention (arguing that
accommodation of and benevolent neutrality towards religion is the best way to pro-
tect the liberties provided by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses); Brief for
the United States Catholic Conference (recognizing the Court's preference for legisla-
tive solutions to social problems and the difficulties inherent in applying the Lemon
test, and arguing that Aguilar and Grand Rapids should be overruled to avoid simi-
lar problems in the future and that Chapter 748 should be upheld).
406. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, School District Raises Church-State Question: Court to
Review Hasidic Village Arrangement, WASH. POST, November 30, 1994, at A16 (noting
that, in voting to grant certiorari to Grumet, "the court voted to reconsider" Lemon);
Victoria J. Dodd, Education and Law Symposium: Introduction, 39 S.D. L REv. 233,
236 (1994) ("The final burial of Lemon ... may come in [Grumet."); Olivo, supra
note 11, at 777 (noting that Grumet, if it reached the Supreme Court, would "prove
to be both an exceptional challenge and opportunity for clarification"); Ann M.
Massie, The Religion Clauses & Parental Health Care Decision-Making for Children:
Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725, 749 n.117 (1994) (not-
ing that Grumet "specifically raises the question of whether the Lemon test should be
overruled"); Marc A. Stadtmauer, Remember the Sabbath? The New York Blue Laws
and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 12 CARDOzO ARTs & ENT. L. J. 213, 220
n.118 (1994) (noting that "[tihe granting of certiorari in [Grumet] has been taken to
be a signal from the court that they are planning to once again review the Lemon
1660
[Vol. 22: 1599, 19951 Kiryas Joel
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tablishment Clause jurisprudence is not at all clear to the lower courts or
the litigants before them. 7
Given the dichotomy between how the lower courts and the legal com-
munity analyzed Grumet and how the Supreme Court analyzed Grumet,
the legal community is left wondering how long the Court's "doctrinal
gridlock" will last and what will eventually become of the Court's Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence." While commentators have the luxury
of waiting out this storm, lower courts must decipher Establishment
Clause precedent and decide what rules apply in the meantime.
Until the Court offers further clarification, lower courts are probably
best-advised to analogize the controversy before them to the most factu-
ally similar precedent and decide accordingly-regardless of the rationale
on which they base their decision."
For further guidance, courts should assess where the controversy be-
fore them fits into the various lines of Establishment Clause precedent
discussed in the Historical Background section and then reconcile their
case with the principles involved in the line of cases the controversy
before them most clearly resembles. While the Court cannot seem to
agree on a rationale or test for Establishment Clause cases, these lines of
cases still produce consistent results after Grumetf°-those results will
standard"). But see Huefner, supra note 101 (observing that when the Court decides
Grumet, it "could reinvigorate the Lemon test ... or introduce yet another analysis
of its own"); Lupu, supra note 25, at 269 ("[T]he Court will once again neither ad-
here to Lemon nor overrule it ... because Establishment Clause precedent of the
last ten years offers many ways to steer around Lemon and still come out either
way"); Thiemann, supra note 10, at 48 (1994) ("The Court's record in adjudicating
cases involving the religion clauses gives us little reason to believe that its judgment
in [Grumet] will be particularly enlightening.").
407. "Grumet throws establishment clause doctrine further into disarray .... [T~he
establishment clause console is now so cluttered with options that the court must
confront the real possibility that it has relinquished its institutional responsibility to
provide a clear user's manual." Bernard James, High Court Takes Confusing Path,
NAT"L L J., August 15, 1994, at C4, C5.
408. Id. at C5.
409. See Adams, supra note 101, at 1039 (suggesting that, with Zobrest, the Court
began using "a new method of Establishment Clause interpretation in which the
Court bases its holdings solely on factual similarities of previous cases instead of
invoking the Lemon test").
410. The trick, however, is how to classify any given Establishment Clause contro-
versy. For example, in Grumet, Justice Souter characterized Chapter 748 as a delega-
tion of civic authority to a religious group, 114 S. Ct. at 2487, while Justice Scalia
characterized the statute as simply creating a public school district, the inhabitants of
which happen to "share the same religion," id. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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be discussed in the next section.11 While lower courts may not be cor-
rect as to the specific test that is appropriate for each case, a result in
accord with precedent and general Establishment Clause principles is
likely to be correct despite the use of the wrong test to reach that result.
For instance, Lemon, fusion, and conferral of authority based on religion
were all used by the Justices in Grumet to invalidate what the Court per-
ceived as a conferral of governmental power on a religious
group"'2 -this result was consistent with government conferral of power
on religious groups precedent generally. ' The lower court decisions,
despite being based almost completely on the Lemon test,' were af-
firmed by the Supreme Court."' Hence, the lower courts reached the
right conclusion, even if they applied the "wrong" test.
2. Impact on Establishment Clause Caselaw
The arena of Establishment Clause caselaw is filled with numerous
types of cases and no single case has been able to set the standard for
deciding the diversity of issues raised by the first phrase of the First
Amendment. Grumet must be kept in perspective and its lessons must
not be extended too far lest the illusion of a "Grand Unified Theory" set
in and distract the Court and court watchers for another two de-
cades.16 Grumet's impact on the Court's Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, beyond its previously-explained effect on the tests proffered by
the Justices,"7 must therefore be kept in perspective. That is, the differ-
ent lines of Establishment Clause caselaw explored in the Historical
Background section"8 will all be affected by Grumet, but Grumet does
not represent a framework against which all future Establishment Clause
cases could, or should, be judged. Grumet's impact stems from its local-
ized effects on the different kinds of cases explored in the Historical
Background section and serves to both clarify and confuse how these
lines of cases will evolve in the future. This section examines those im-
pacts and predicts the evolution of those lines of cases.
411. See infmr notes 416-46 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 203-311 and accompanying text.
413. See infra notes 439-45 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 184-201 and accompanying text.
415. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,
2484 (1994).
416. Id. at 2498-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor explained that the
Lemon test caused a similar distraction. Id. at 2498-500 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
417. See supra notes 315-99 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 24-151 and accompanying text.
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a. Impact on government aid to religion cases
Government aid to religion cases can be placed into three subgroups:
direct state funding of nonpublic institutions; neutral aid schemes, the
benefit of which accrues to citizens regardless of religious affiliation or
nonaffiliation; and removal of obstacles to free exercise."'
Grumet is not a direct state funding of nonpublic institutions case
because, as pointed out by Justice Scalia, "no public funding, however
slight or indirect" accrued to the private sectarian Village schools.'
The Kiryas Joel District operated a public school and there was no evi-
dence that such school operated explicitly to serve the religious mission
of the Satmars, as did the Village's private schools." Thus, Grumet will
likely have little direct effect on that line of cases.
Future neutral aid scheme cases may feel Grumet's impact because
five Justices stated their willingness to reconsider Aguilar v. Felton'
and four stated their willingness to reconsider School District of the City
of Grand Rapids v. BaW2 -- two direct state funding of religious institu-
tions cases. In light of how the Village dealt with its disabled children's
inability to receive state and federal aid to which they were entitled,
those five Justices seem to have acknowledged, in Grumet, that sending
419. See supra notes 30-67 and accompanying text (discussing direct state funding
of nonpublic institutions cases); supra notes 68-108 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing neutral aid scheme cases); supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text (discussing
removal of obstacles to free exercises cases).
420. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
421. See id.; Petitioner Attorney General of the State of New York's Brief at 5,
Grumet (Nos. 93-517, 93-527 & 93-539); Petitioner Board of Education of the
Monroe-Woodbury Central School District's Brief at 6-7, Grumet (Nos. 93-517, 93-527
& 93-539).
422. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2505 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring), 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
423. Id. at 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 2514-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Before the
Court handed down its decision in Grumet, this commentary was offered to explain
what would happen to Establishment Clause jurisprudence if Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985), was invalidated:
New York could return to its original strategy of providing remedial services
to disabled Satmarer children on the premises of the religious academies in
the village. Of course, if Aguilar were to disappear, New York could act simi-
larly with respect to all private schools, religious or otherwise, and thereby
curb the constitutional defect as it presently stands. Such a practice would
be perfectly consistent with formal religious neutrality, though not with
separationism.
Lupu, supra note 25, at 272.
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public employees to nonpublic schools to provide those services would
be preferable to the solution offered by Chapter 748.' Recognizing that
Aguilar and Grand Rapids prevented such a solution, the Justices ex-
pressed their sentiment that under a neutral, generally applicable law,
like the IDEA, programs like those struck down in Aguilar and Grand
Rapids would, in the future, represent permissible neutral aid schemes
rather than impermissible direct state funding of religious groups.'
Furthermore, all of the Justices in Grumet reaffirmed their support for
neutral governmental aid schemes which incidentally benefit religion by
including religious institutions within their reach. 2 ' Accordingly,
Grumet will likely make some programs permissible as neutral aid
scheme cases where formerly they would have been regarded as imper-
missible direct state aid to nonpublic insitutions. The impact of this shift
on governments' ability to provide special education services to private
religious school students will be explored in the Governmental Impact
section.42
At first glance, Grumet confuses removal of government obstacles to
citizens' free exercise of religion cases.'s Grumet is factually similar to
Wisconsin v. Yoder,' a crucial removal of obstacles to free exercise
case: both communities attempted to isolate themselves from modem
American culture; both communities had their own cultural heritage very
different from that of the rest of the nation, including modes of worship,
dress, and social interaction; and both communities disagreed with their
state governments' ideas as to how children should be educated.' In
Yoder, the Court exempted Amish children from Wisconsin's compulsory
education requirements because the children's free exercise interests
would, in the Court's view, have been significantly compromised by re-
quiring them to attend school beyond the eighth grade."' In Grumet,
the Court denied the Satmar children a school district designed to alle-
viate the "panic, fear and trauma" they endured while attending public
schools outside the Village because the New York legislature acted to
424. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text; supra notes 273-76 and accom-
panying text; supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text; supra notes 273-76 and accom-
panying text. Justice Scalia also noted that Aguilar and Board of Education of the
City of Grands Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), are "so hostile to our national
tradition of accommodation" that they "should be overruled at the earliest opportuni-
ty.' Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
426. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2492-93 (plurality opinion), 2495 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring), 2501 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
427. See infa notes 447-85 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 109-121.
429. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
430. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2485-86; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209-17.
431. 406 U.S. at 215-19, 36.
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remedy the Satmars' unique plight when it enacted Chapter 748.1 In
both cases, therefore, the government (either the Court or state legisla-
ture) sought to exempt a religious group from compromising the integrity
of its religious customs in order to either comply with the law or receive
benefits provided by law. Neither exemption guaranteed that similar
exemptions would be granted to all similarly situated groups.' The
Court, however, did not decide the same way in both cases-it held for
the Amish- but not the Satmars,- perhaps for three reasons.
First, Yoder involved a judge-made exemption of a religious group
from criminal prosecution by a state enforcing its general, neutrally ap-
plicably education law. Grumet, on the other hand, involved a
legislatively-enacted law that responded to a religious group's dissatis-
faction with its school district's provision of social welfare services and
conferred civic authority upon a village defined by its religious affiliation.
Thus, the first difference between Yoder and Grumet is a distinction be-
tween a judge-made exception and legislatively-created civic authority.
Second, the Amish were criminally prosecuted for exercising their reli-
gious beliefs while the Satmar were simply unable to take advantage of
state and federal social welfare provisions in a manner most agreeable to
them. The second difference, then, is a distinction between being subject
to state persecution for adherence to particular beliefs and experiencing
difficulty in attaining government services as a result of adherence to
particular beliefs. Finally, in Yoder, the Court framed its analysis under
the Free Exercise Clause and spent little time discussing Establishment
Clause concerns.' Grumet, however, focused on the Establishment
Clause and only briefly acknowledged Free Exercise concerns.' There-
fore, the final difference in the Court's focus was on Free Exercise
Clause principles in one case and Establishment Clause principles in
another, despite the significant factual similarities.
In the future, these differences will aid the court in determining wheth-
er to apply the Grumet or Yoder standard in judging governmental ac-
commodations of religious free exercise that invoke Establishment
Clause concerns. Apparently, where a religious group seeks exemption
from a criminal law because of religion, the Court will apply Yoder and
432. 114 S. Ct. at 2485-87.
433. Id. at 2488; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-35.
434. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
435. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2494.
436. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214, 235 n.22.
437. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2487.
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Free Exercise principles. On the other hand, where a religious group
complains that it is denied social welfare benefits because of religion and
the government responds with special treatment, the Court will probably
apply Grumet and Establishment Clause principles. Thus, Grumet's im-
pact in the area where Free Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns
meet is in defining which religion clause courts should use in evaluating
furture cases with fact patterns analogous to Yoder and Grumet.'
b. Impact on allocation of state power based on religion or
in support of religion cases
Future cases involving the allocation of state power in support of reli-
gion will be most directly impacted by Grumet." These are likely to be
significantly influenced by the Grumet result and, more specifically Jus-
tice Souter's new fusion test, when they present fact patters similar to
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,' Edwards v. Aguillard,"' and Grumet
itself-where civic powers are placed in the hands of religious groups.
Currently, five Justices support the Grumet result," making the case
an important solidification of the Court's disapproval of the purposeful
delegation of political power to religious groups. Although only three
Justices who supported the fusion test remain on the Court,"3 that is
two more than supported the position of Justice O'Connor or Justice
Kennedy in Grumet.'" Although in Larkin and Edwards, the Court re-
lied on the Lemon test,"' after Grumet, it is clear that such a test is no
longer satisfactory. Hence, the fusion test presents a new analytical
framework under which future cases of this type can be evaluated.
Therefore, Grumet solidified the principle that states may not place gov-
438. While fact patterns analogous to Grumet and Yoder may seem rare, Chapter
748 sparked concern that if the statute survived constitutional attack "other
religion-based school districts soon will follow: inner-city Muslims, Southern evangeli-
cals, Catholics in South Boston." Mauro, supra note 182, at A2.
439. See supra notes 122-51 and accompanying text.
440. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
441. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
442. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,
2484 (1994). Justice Blackmun, who sided with the majority in Grumet, retired from
the Court after the 1993-94 term. See Herman Schwartz, Justice Blackmun, 43 AM. U.
L REV. 737 (1994).
443. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg supported Justice Souter's fusion test, along with
Justice Blackmun who retired from the Court after the 1993-94 term. See Schwartz,
supra note 442, at 738.
444. No other Justices joined in the concurrences of Justices O'Connor and Kenne-
dy. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2495 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2500 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
445. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-83 (1987); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,
459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982).
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ernmental functions in the hands of religious groups and introduced a
new test for judging such cases that commands the support of three
Justices. As a result, future allocations of state power on religious
grounds will clearly continue to result in Establishment Clause violations.
Thus, Grumet left substantively in tact, although rhetorically adjusted,
the four Establishment Clause principles distilled earlier in the Historical
Background section:" the government may not directly aid religion; the
government may promulgate neutral aid schemes from which religion
may incidentally benefit; the government may not delegate its power to
religious groups; and the government may not endorse a particular reli-
gion.
B. Governmental Impact
Grumet is the Court's second decision in as many terms which ad-
dresses the provision of special education services to disabled children
attending private religious schools."7 Thus, Grumet suggests that the
Court is increasingly willing to allow the provision of state and federal
aid to disabled students attending private religious schools, as long as
the aid is provided under plans which are generally applicable to both
private and public school students.'0 Beyond whether the Establish-
ment Clause permitted the conduct at issue in Grumet and Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District' remained the issue of how the
United States would balance its commitment to providing aid to disabled
students with its duty to adhere to the Establishment Clause." On one
446. See supra notes 24-151 and accompanying text.
447. In the 1992-1993 term the Court decided Zobrest v. Catalina Foothill School
District, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). See supra notes 97-98, 101-04 and accompanying text.
448. See Schimmel, supra note 400, at 696 (suggesting that Grumet's significance
lies in the Justices' call to reconsider Aguilar v. Felton).
449. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
450. See generally Allan G. Osborne, Special Education and Related Services for
Parochial School Students, 81 EDUc. L REP. 1 (West 1993) (evaluating the effect of
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence on the provision of special education
services to religious school students). Osborne points out that, while the Court has
approved the provision of special education services at neutral cites adjacent to pri-
vate schools, this is not a viable alternative for private school students with serious
disabilities. Id. at 1. Also, religious beliefs, such as those of the Satmar Hasidim, may
prevent children from leaving their private schools and receiving services at public
schools. Id. As a result, "a child with disabilities does not have the same freedom of
choice that a nondisabled child has" and parents may be "forced to choose between
adhering to their religious beliefs or exercising their right to obtain an appropriate
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hand, it is inequitable for a government, whether state or federal, to
provide special education services to disabled students attending public
schools and not to those attending private, sometimes religious,
schools."' Such a distinction is explicitly rejected by the IDEA.' Nev-
ertheless, providing government-funded services to students in private
religious schools triggers significant Establishment Clause concerns."
This section briefly examines the nature of the government aid involved
in this area, reviews the Court's relevant pre-Grumet case law and evalu-
ates how Grumet impacts the solution of future conflicts between gov-
ernment aid programs benefitting disabled private religious school stu-
dents and the Establishment Clause.
At the federal level, the IDEA authorizes the provision of certain
special education services to eligible disabled students.' The IDEA
"distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as disabled" under
the act "without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian nature of the educa-
tional institution." ' Qualifying students are entitled "access to pro-
grams and services appropriate to meet their special education
needs." ' More specifically:
[S]chool districts must provide children with disabilities with a "free appropriate
public education" which requires that "special education" and "related services"
be provided at public expense, in conformity with an "individualized education
education for their children." Id.
451. Id. "People may not be denied rights and privileges available to nonbelievers
just because they are religious." Sturtz, supra note 101, at 308.
452. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1413(a)(4)(A) (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); see Petitioner Board of
Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School District's Brief at 28.
453. See supra notes 30-31, 77-90 and accompanying text.
454. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 et seq. (West 1990 & Supp. 1994). The IDEA was first
known as the Education for the Handicapped Act, Part B, which passed in 1975. See
Michaelle G. Cacchillo, Note, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District. A Victory
for Disabled Children, A Snub for the Lemon Test, 25 LoY. U. CHi L.J. 445, 445
(1994); Perry A. Zirkel, Over-Due Process Revisions for the Individuals with Disabil-
ities Education Act, 55 MoNT. L REV. 403 (1994).
455. 20 U.S.C. 1400-1485 (1988). For a summary of the IDEA and private education,
see Cacchillo, supra note 454, 447-50.
456. Petitioner Board of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School
District's Brief at 8 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462
(1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)).
Furthermore, the IDEA "specifically mandates inclusion of private (including parochi-
al) school students within the programs and services required by the Act." Id. at 28;
see Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467. The Court has also held that parents must be reim-
bursed for expenses incurred in sending their child to a private school if the parents
do so in response to the public school's inadequate accommodation of the child's
disability under the IDEA and the private school offers better services under the
IDEA. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 114 S. Ct. 361, 362 (1993).
457. Petitioner Board of Education of the Monroe-Woodbury Central School
District's Brief at 28.
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program"... tailored to meet the unique needs of the individual student with dis-
abilities. All students with disabilities are entitled to receive these services in the
district where they reside.'
Supplementing this nationwide command, states have implemented simi-
lar programs which set standards for the education of and provision of
services for disabled students.' When a student entitled to receive ser-
vices under the IDEA (or its state counterpart) attends a private religious
school,, Establishment Clause concerns arise.'
As discussed in the Historical Background section, the Court consis-
tently invalidates those programs it characterizes as direct money grants
to private religious schools, regardless of the purpose of the grants.'
In Aguilar v. Felton' and School District of the City of Grand Rapids
v. Ball,' the Court also invalidated state statutes which sent public em-
ployees into private religious schools to provide various health and wel-
fare services.' However, the provision of certain services to private re-
ligious school students, like diagnostic health services, has met Court ap-
proval where the services are part of generally applicable aid schemes
from which both public and nonpublic students benefit and which do not
directly further the religious missions of private religious schools.'
Specifically, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind' and Zobrest,"7 the Court approved the provision of state spe-
cial education services to disabled students under neutral, generally ap-
plicable government aid programs.' Further, in Zobrest, the Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether, under the IDEA, a state employee could
accompany a deaf student to his private religious school as his
deaf-language interpreter.' The Court stated:
458. Respondents' Brief at 14.
459. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-761 et seq. (1991 & Supp. 1994); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW ART. 89 (McKinney 1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-213, -221 (Michie 1950).
460. See, e.g., Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2484-85; Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2462; Witters,
474 U.S. at 481.
461. See supra notes 32-62 and accompanying text.
462. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
463. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
464. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 45-50, 77-90 and accompanying text.
466. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
467. 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
468. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469 (1993); Witters, 474 U.S. at 489 (1986); see supra
notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
469. Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at. 2464.
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The IDEA creates a neutral government program dispensing aid not to schools but
to individual handicapped children. If a handicapped child chooses to enroll in a
sectarian school, we hold that the Establishment Clause does not prevent the
school district from furnishing him with a sign-language interpreter there in order
to facilitate his education.' "
Finally, a majority of Justices in Grumet stated their willingness to re-
consider Aguilar, and four Justices agreed to do the same with Grand
Rapids.47 Thus, the Court apparently remains willing to allow public
employees to assist disabled students one-on-one in private religious
schools if done under neutral, generally applicable aid schemes."m Fur-
ther, the Court is most likely willing to overrule or limit the prohibition
of public employees from conducting special education classes and per-
forming special education services on private religious school premis-
es.
473
The Court, through Witters, Zobrest, and Grumet, has drawn a chart of
how it will navigate between permissible government aid for disabled
private religious school students and impermissible direct aid to religious
schools.474 Witters and Zobrest teach that disabled private religious
school students may receive some kinds state educational assistance
under the auspices of a state or federal aid schemes which apply to pub-
lic and nonpublic students alike.' The Grumet Court, however, struck
470. See Adams, supra note 101, at 1053-57 (suggesting that Zobrest signaled an
accommodating turn in this area towards allowing aid to flow to religious school
students as long as the aid went primarily to the student and not the religious in-
stitution).
471. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2498
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2505 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 2515 (Scalia, J.,
concurring, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas). While Justice
O'Connor did not mention Board of Education of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 U.S. 373 (1985), her reaffirmance of her disagreement with the result in Aguliar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. at 402 (1985), indicates that she would also be willing to recon-
sider Grand Rapids because she dissented in part in that case for the reasons she
laid out in her Aguilar dissent. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 398-99.
472. See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct at 2466; Witters, 474 U.S. at 489. Zobrest's potential
effects on the role of government in private, namely religious, education has been
both commended and criticized. For commendation, see Cacchillo, supra note 454, at
479 (noting that the decision represented a "victory for disabled children seeking edu-
cation in a sectarian school"). For criticism; see Leading Cases, State Aid to Paro-
chial Schools, 107 HARv. L REV. 215, 224 (1993) (viewing Zobrest as "an exercise that
dangerously opened the door for increased government involvement with religion").
473. "If Aguilar were overruled or abandoned, New York could return to its original
strategy of providing remedial services to disabled Satmarer children on the premises
of the religious academies in the village." Lupu, supra note 25, at 272.
474. While these cases give a strong indication of this course, the Court has not ex-
plicitly indicated that this will be its approach to analogous future cases. See
McKinney, supra note 375, at 597-99.
475. It has further been suggested that "these cases ... seem to support . . . the
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down an attempt to provide such generally available services because the
attempt amounted to an impermissible delegation of civic authority to a
religious group."m At the same time, a majority of the Court expressed
its willingness to overturn the precedent which lead to the New York
legislature's conferral of civic authority to a religious group.4' Hence
Grumet created a boundary beyond which governments cannot reach to
facilitate the provision of special education services. After Grumet, state
and federal governments appear free to provide special education servic-
es to disabled students at neutral cites adjacent to private schools.4 "
Furthermore, governments may send a public employee to assist a dis-
abled student one-on-one,m and, in some instances, place public em-
ployees in the private religious school classroom itself to assist disabled
students.e Governments cannot, however, enact measures applicable
only to specific religious groups to facilitate that groups' receipt of spe-
cial education services." Thus, Grumet prohibits direct money grants
to religious institutions and special measures to facilitate the ability of
select groups to take advantage of generally applicable special education
services. However, the Justices' call to reconsider Aguilar and Grand
Rapids, when coupled with the holdings of Witters, Zobrest, and Grumet,
indicates that the provision of vocational or personal special education
proposition that a facially neutral statute offering general assistance without reference
to religion will almost always survive an Establishment Clause attack." Sturtz, supra
note 101, at 302-03. Overall, the Court's decisions regarding the provision of special
education services to religious school students "indicate that direct instructional ser-
vices may not be provided by a public entity on the premises of a sectarian school,
but that some supportive services are permissible." Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Providing
Special Education and Related Services to Parochial School Students in the Wake of
Zobrest, 87 EDUC. L REP. 329,329 (West 1994).
476. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,
2487 (1994).
477. "It is the Court's insistence on disfavoring religion in Aguilar that led New
York to favor it here." Id. at 2498 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "A neutral aid scheme,
available to religious and nonreligious alike, is the preferable way to address prob-
lems such as the Satmar handicapped children have suffered." Id. at 2505 (Kennedy,
J., concurring); see Lupu, supra note 25, at 272.
478. See Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2493; Underwood, supra note 25, at 62.
479. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist, 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993); Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
480. As Justice O'Connor stated in Grumet: "If the government provides this educa-
tion on-site at public schools and at nonsectarian private schools, it is only fair that
it provide it on-site at sectarian schools as well." 114 S. Ct. at 2498 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
481. Id. at 2481.
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services via generally applicable statutes to both public and nonpublic
school students is constitutional.
Thus, the Court appears willing to address the conflict between the
IDEA (and its state counterparts) and the Establishment Clause and by
molding precedent into a form that allows governments more flexibility
in providing aid to disabled private religious school students.' The
Court certainly will restrict the extent of the instruction and programs
provided by the state on religious school premises to remain consistent
with Establishment Clause precedent prohibiting direct state aid to reli-
gious groups.' The aid schemes must be neutral towards religion and
applicable to all students, public and private, and the private religious
schools must receive at most a slight, attenuated financial benefit from
the aid program.' Because a majority of Justices called for Aguilar's
reconsideration, Grumet indicates that the Court is willing to let govern-
ment provide aid directly to disabled students, regardless of the religious
denomination of the school they attend, and regardless of the fact that
the aid may be provided much closer to home than previous cases indi-
cated. Therefore, the conflict between state and federal funding of spe-
cial education services for disabled students and the Establishment
Clause appears somewhat diminished after Grumet."
482. See Sturtz, supra note 101, at 308 (stating that "the Establishment Clause bar-
riers to public support for religion after Zobrest seem a bit lower"). The Court has
yet to rule on whether the IDEA requires that services be provided at religious
schools, but lower courts have addressed the issue and found that public districts
may provide services on public campuses only. See Goodall v. Stafford County Sch.
Bd., 930 F.2d 363, 370 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 864 (1991); Osborne,
supra note 475, at 337-38. Furthermore, the Court has yet to directly address the
effect of 34 C.F.R. § 76.532: "[A] Federal Department of Education regulation, which
prohibits a school district from using Federal grant money to pay for 'religious wor-
ship, instruction or proselytization' or to pay for equipment used for religious wor-
ship, instruction or proselytization." McKinney, supra note 375, at 596 (quoting 34
C.F.R. § 76.532). The Court will be forced to confront these issues in the future
"when parents ask for increased special education related services to be delivered on
parochial school premises." Id. at 597.
483. In Zobrest, the Court pointed out that the facts that the IDEA does not pre-
vent parents from freely selecting between private and public school for their chil-
dren and that, under the IDEA, no public money goes to sectarian schools, were key
to the program passing Establishment Clause muster. 113 S. Ct. at 2467-68. Thus the
Court appears to remain committed to the principle that state aid may not go direct-
ly to religious groups. See McKinney, supra note 375, at 599. Justice Kennedy, in
Zobrest, pointed out that even a neutral aid scheme would be limited by the Estab-
lishment Clause "insofar as it authorized the provision of teachers... [sluch a pro-
gram would not be saved simply because it supplied teachers to secular as well as
sectarian schools." 113 S. Ct. at 2473.
484. See Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2467-68; Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986).
485. Even after Zobrest, before the Court indicated its willingness to reconsider
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is "one constant in religious jurisprudence, which is the Court
has conflicting precedent and is not yet prepared to agree on any of
it." ' Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v.
Grumet is a spellbinding display of the United States Supreme Court's
utter inability to clearly and consistently adjudicate Establishment Clause
cases. To be sure, any area of constitutional law in which personal con-
victions play so large a role is bound to be permeated by complex cases
in which the Justices struggle to agree.47 But recent Establishment
Clause decisions, Grumet being a prime example, evidence a persistent
lack of consensus among the Justices on every level of analysis.
After Grumet, lower courts are left to pick up the pieces of the Court's
Establishment Clause failures and struggle to discern the constitutionally
correct outcome of future Establishment Clause disputes. In its duty to
establish clear precedent for lower courts, then, the Court has failed.'
One positive aspect of the Grumet decision is its signal to disabled
students attending private religious schools that the Court is increasingly
willing to accommodate their special education needs. While the result in
Grumet appears to disfavor these students, in the long run commentators
might view this case as the point at which a majority of Justices realized
that the Establishment Clause had gone too far in preventing neutral aid
programs from reaching private religious school students. The Justices'
call to reconsider Aguilar and Grand Rapids indicates that while Chap-
ter 748 could not withstand scrutiny, the Monroe-Woodbury District's
previous solution of providing the special education services at an annex
to a Village private school, which was abandoned because of these deci-
Aguilar and Grand Rapids, it was suggested that "the Court will resolve conflicts
under the IDEA in favor of disabled children wherever possible." Cacchlllo, supra
note 454, at 479.
486. Robert H. Freilich et al., The Supreme Court in Transition: Consensus Build-
ing or Ducking the Issues and Other Developments in Urban, State and Local Gov-
ernment Law, 25 URB. LAW. 697, 724 (1993).
487. "People are bound to reach different conclusions as to what constitutes an
establishment of religion even if the same terms are used to express that concept In
addition, one must accept that the concepts are dynamic; the constitution is a dy-
namic body of law." Underwood, supra note 25, at 102.
488. Even before the Court added its Grumet opinion to the confusion, the Court's
recent Establishment Clause decisions "left the law in a state of confusion...
and... have not been successful in clearing up any of the confusion." EI-Sayed,
supra note 147, at 476.
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sions, now represents a constitutionally permissible accommodation of
religion.
The "doctrinal gridlock"' that Lemon spawned and Grumet perpetu-
ated must end. Justice O'Connor wisely called on the Grumet Court to
step back from its myopic search for a single "Grand Unified Theory" for
Establishment Clause cases and deal in a frank and principled manner
with the diverse questions the Establishment Clause asks.' An ap-
proach that focuses directly on the nature of the Establishment Clause
issues present in each case, instead of one that focuses on the whole of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence at every turn, would likely produce a
number of different tests, each with its own specific area of application.
By adopting this kind of analysis, the Court would adopt a fresh and
useful approach to this area of law and finally dispose of the sour fruit
that has spoiled its Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
JOANNE KUHNS
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489. James, supra note 407, at C4.
490. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481,
2498-99 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
